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Welcome to the post-Suharto era 
The election of Abdurrachman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri as President and Vice-President 
of Indonesia marks the end of the New Order Suharto period which lasted almost three and a half 
decades. For the first time in 54 years, the Indonesian people have been able to exercise their right 
to elect a government. The new leaders are both well known public figures and both are offspring of 
famous families. It has become a tradition in many Asian countries for heads of state to come from 
famous families. 
Abdurrachman Wahid, known popularly as Gus Dur, de-
scends from a famous dynasty. His grandfather KH Hasyim 
Asyari was the founder of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the 
Muslim organisation which is still led by Gus Dur. The NU 
is believed to be the largest Muslim organisation in the 
world with an estimated 30 million members. Gus Dur' s 
father, Wahid Hasyim was appointed Minister of Religious 
Affairs in the Republic's first cabinet in 1945. Several Ja-
karta streets are named after both his grandfather and father. 
This family tradition is being continued with the election of 
Gus Dur as Indonesia's fourth President. 
Megawati Sukarnoputri was elected as Vice-President 
the day after being defeated in the vote for the presidency. 
Until the very last moment, it had been widely assumed that 
she would win the presidency. In the elections in June, her 
party, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-
Perjuangan), won more than a third of the votes, far ahead 
of the runner-up, Golkar, with 20 per cent. But the president 
is elected by an electoral college, the MER composed of 700 
members, and she was defeated by deft political deals struck 
behind her back by Wahid, her friend for many years. After 
the humiliation of such a defeat, the traditional Javanese 
style of seeking harmony was brought into play to persuade 
her to accept the nomination as vice-president. 
In the days before the presidential election, Megawati 
supporters were out in many cities calling for her election 
and threatening to plunge the country into chaos if anyone 
else was elected. Her defeat brought angry crowds onto the 
streets in many cities and the fear of continuing unrest 
played a role in persuading her to agree to become second 
fiddle to President Wahid. 
Much has been made of Gus Dur's frail health. He is 
almost totally blind, walks with difficulty and has suffered 
two strokes recently. But he is a man with a towering per-
sonality and plenty of energy so it would be wrong to under-
estimate his ability to lead. 
Santri-abangan dichotomy 
Most students of contemporary Indonesia accept the 
concept of the abangan-santri division in Javanese society. 
The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who first ob-
served this social phenomenon, described the two strands as 
pious Muslims (santri) and secular Muslims (abangan) . 
While Gus Dur represents the santri group, Megawati 
comes from a typical abangan background. Megawati and 
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Gus Dur both have mass followings in East Java as well as 
in large parts of Central Java, Indonesia's two most popu-
lous provinces. While Gus Dur's following is almost en-
tirely rural, Megawati enjoys the support of the urban poor 
and lower middle class. 
The abangan-santri dichotomy is political as well socio-
cultural. Since the early days of the Indonesian Republic, the 
main political parties have divided along santri-abangan 
lines. The major Muslim parties were santri parties while 
the nationalist, socialist and communist parties relied on the 
abangan vote. The Gus Dur/Megawati could represent a 
unifying factor between the two communities. 
Gus Dur and Mega, representing unity 
Different backgrounds 
It is no exaggeration to say that whoever is chosen to run 
present-day Indonesia can expect to become unpopular. The 
numerous problems the new government will face would be 
daunting for the most seasoned politicians. The Indonesian 
economy is still in deep crisis while unresolved political 
problems inherited from Habibie' s transitional administra-
tion are immense. People's expectations are running high 
and the new government will not be able to deliver much in 
its first months in office. It will take more than one or two 
years to overcome the economic and political bankruptcy 
inherited from thirty-three years of the Suharto dictatorship 
and 
The country's new leaders hail from very different back-
grounds. Gus Dur has played the role of guru bangsa 
(teacher of the nation) for many years. As a religious leader 
he distanced himself from political parties during the Su-
harto era, using his moral authority to preach tolerance and 
moderation. Christian, Hindu and Buddhist minorities have 
learned to look to him for understanding and protection 
when they come under attack from racist mobs. Gus Dur 
was also the one who persuaded the Nahdlatul Ulama to 
withdraw from active politics in the 1980s. But in the clos-
ing years of the Suharto era, when de-politicisation, the 
hallmark of the New Order, was stifling everything, Gus 
Dur gradually became more active in politics. 
Gus Dur is a melding of cosmopolitanism and tradition-
alism. He studied in Alexandria and Bagdad and had ma:le a 
habit of travelling abroad frequently to E~ope andNorth 
America. As proof of how broad-minded he 1s, he ~ven tr~v­
elled to Israel to attend a conference devoted to mter-faith 
reconciliation despite angry complaints from Muslims f~r 
whom any ties with the Jewish state are anathema. But he ~s 
also a very traditional leader who frequently speak~ to his 
huge following in rural Java, knowing that they wtll mob 
him to kiss his hand or touch his clothes. 
Megawati grew up in the presidential p~lace and after 
her father was ousted in 1967, her only claim to fame for 
many years was as the daughter of a famous and ~uch­
loved president and the wife of a rather wealthy busme~~­
man. It was not until the 1980s that she emerged as a pohtI-
cal figure, when she was asked to help one of the two ?11Y 
parties, the PDI, to boost its fortunes in the fake elections 
that were held under Suharto and became a member of the 
rubber-stamp parliament. In 1993, she took over as the 
leader of the POI where she was idolised as a symbol of 
Sukarno's former popularity rather than as someone with 
political skills. Her battle for the leadership of the PDI was 
fraught with difficulties because the regime feared that the 
Sukarno name might undermine Golkar' s ability to go on 
winning its 70 per cent plurality in stage-managed elections. 
She only won the battle with the help of power-brokers from 
the army who were at odds with Suharto. 
It was under her leadership that the PDI became a rally-
ing point for growing opposition to Suharto. In an attempt to 
smash the party, she was removed as the chairperson in an 
inner-party coup engineered by Suharto and on 27 July 
1996, security forces assisted by hired thugs attacked the 
PDI headquarters in Jakarta, setting it alight and killing 
many PDI activists trapped inside. 
Since then Megawati has carried the cross of a martyr, 
while being hailed as Indonesia's most celebrated opposition 
leader. In the June elections, her PDI-P took a commanding 
lead, winning 34 per cent of the votes. Few doubted that she 
would be the next president and expected her to travel the 
country giving speeches and popularising her party's poli-
cies. But she said little, rarely gave interviews and hardly 
ever travelled anywhere, behaving like a queen, disdainful 
of the rough and tumble of everyday political campaigning. 
She and her advisers failed to understand that in the new 
political climate, it was necessary to build a coalition, at a 
time when the many small Muslim parties with seats in the 
supreme legislative assembly (MPR) were rallying round 
Gus Dur. While she was seen outside as the country's most 
popular leader, anti-Megawati sentiments were spreading 
inside the MPR, some Muslim leaders murmuring darkly 
that Islam did not allow a woman to become a head of state. 
Civilian leadership 
The most refreshing thing about the country's new lead-
ers is that they are civilians and have made pledges to intro-
duce political reforms. But it remains to be seen how far 
they will go, what team of ministers they will assemble and 
whether the Gus Dur/Megawati duo will curb the powers of 
the Indonesian armed forces. 
We set out in the following article our own human rights 
agenda for Indonesia's new government. * 
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Human rights agenda for the government 
TAPOL has written to newly elected President Wahid and Vice-President Megawati calling on them 
to put the observance of human rights at the heart of their Government's policy. Our lengthy 
agenda is indicative of the parlous human rights situation inherited by the new Government and the 
drastic need for fundamental institutional and legislative changes. The letter reads as follows: 
We congratulate you warmly on your election as Indone-
sia's President and Vice-President. We welcome this as the 
beginning of a new era bringing an end to the bleak years of 
the Suharto military dictatorship. In the spirit of reformasi 
which we believe should dominate the new Government's 
programme, we call on you to take the following measures 
in order to ensure that human rights observance is at the 
heart of your Government's policy: 
Release all political prisoners 
Scores of people are still in prison on political charges. 
They include dozens of people being held in Aceh and West 
Papua (lrian Jaya) as well as at least twenty people being 
held in prisons in Java. 
We draw attention in particular to sixteen East Timorese 
prisoners held in Semarang prison of whom three have been 
in prison since 1991. They should be released forthwith and 
returned honie to East Timor under the protection of the In-
ternational Red Cross. We also demand the immediate re-
lease of the six prisoners arrested in 1996 as leaders or ac-
tivists of the Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD) or related 
mass organisations. 
Violators should not go unpunished 
Ever since Suharto seized power in 1965, impunity has 
protected members of the security forces from due process 
and punishment for crimes against innocent and defenceless 
people. 
Your Government will only be able make a true break 
with the New Order years if it ends impunity by: 
1. Setting up independent commissions of inquiry to in-
vestigate grave incidents such as the Tanjung Priok Massa-
cre in September 1984, the Lampung killings in 1987 and 
the killing of six Trisakti students in May 1998. 
2. Revoking Presidential Decree in Lieu of Law enacted 
in September 1999 to establish a Human Rights Court 
(which allows exemptions for suspects from the security 
forces) and replacing it with a law to create a human rights 
court to try all those responsible for crimes against humanity 
during the New Order and since. 
3. Conducting investigations into the serious human 
rights abuses in East Timor and bringing those responsible 
to justice in Indonesian or international courts 
4. Co-operating fully with the UN's international com-
mission of inquiry into human rights abuses in East Timor 
set up under UN Human Rights Commission Resolution 
adopted on 27 September 1999 and with any subsequent 
decision by the UN Security Council to set up an ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal. 
5. Initiating comprehensive investigations into the mas-
sacres perpetrated in the months following Suharto's seizure 
of power in 1965 when at least half a million people were 
slain, with a view to bringing all those responsible, includ-
ing former President Suharto, to justice. 
6. Conducting a thorough investigation into the disap-
pearance of thirteen pro-democracy activists who were ab-
ducted in the months prior to Suharto's downfall. The fami-
lies of the 'disappeared' should be told without delay 
whether they are alive or dead, and all those responsible 
should be brought to justice. 
7. Conducting investigations into the thousands of human 
rights abuses perpetrated in Aceh during the period of DOM 
(military operations region) and all those responsible 
brought to justice. 
8. Conducting investigations into many thousands of hu-
man rights abuses perpetrated in West Papua since the ter-
ritory became Indonesia's 26th province in 1969 following a 
fraudulent 'act of free choice', with special emphasis on the 
abuses during the 1990s, and all those responsible brought 
to justice. 
Repeal anti-human rights legislation 
The Indonesian Crimitial Code contains a number of ar-
ticles which provide for persons to be charged and convicted 
for political activities. These include the 'hate-sowing' arti-
cles and articles which make it an offence to 'insult' the 
head of state or government officials. They also include six 
articles which were incorporated into the Criminal Code in 
April this year when the anti-subversion law was repealed, 
making it an offence to try to replace the Pancasila or to 
promote Marxist/Leninist teachings, the effect being that the 
basis for charging people for their political beliefs under the 
anti-subversion law has now become part of the Criminal 
Code. 
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All these articles should be repealed so as to safeguard 
citizens' right to engage in peaceful political activity with-
out fear of arrest and conviction. 
The Law on States of Emergency adopted by the previ-
ous Parliament but not signed into law by the former Presi-
dent should be scrapped and the 1959 law on states of 
emergency should be revoked. 
Reform of the Judiciary 
During the Suharto era and the Habibie transitional ad-
ministration, a number of organs having no basis in law or 
in the Constitution were created, such as Bakorstanas(da) 
(National Stability Coordinating Council), and the Dewan 
Pemantapan Keamanan dan Sistem Hukum (Council to 
Consolidate Security and the System of Law), both of which 
are dominated by the military. Such bodies should be dis-
solved without delay. 
The Indonesian Judiciary is notorious for corruption and 
for its deep penetration by the military, as a result of which 
trials for political activities or corruption are heavily biased 
against the accused and the verdicts usually fixed in ad-
vance. An overhaul of the Judiciary is essential if Indonesia 
is to become a state based not on political power or bribery 
but on the rule of law. The Government should take steps to 
initiate a comprehensive reform of the Judiciary, in the 
meanwhile ensuring that all persons occupying key posi-
tions are beyond reproach and not susceptible to influence 
by special interests . 
End TNl's political control through terri-
torial commands 
During the 34 years of Suharto' s authorit~an ~e and 
the 1 7 months of the Habibie transitional administration, the 
Indonesian armed forces (TNI) have maintaine~ a ~ight grip 
on the population by means of the army's temtonal s~c­
ture. The TNI now plans to reinforce this structure by m-
creasing the number of regional military commands 
(kodam ), the district military commands (kodim) and lower-
echelon commands. The TNI 's military intelligence agency 
BAIS spies on citizens, spreads disinformation, blac~~sts 
people from entering or leaving the country on. ~ohtI~al 
grounds and exerts a repressive influence on pohtical life 
through its covert operations. 
The TNI' s territorial structure should be dismantled, 
BAIS dissolved, and the Indonesian army, navy and air 
force should confine their activities to defending the state 
against the threat of external aggression, operating strictly 
under civilian control. 
All so-called 'non-organic' troops being deployed in 
Aceh, West Papua and elsewhere where opposition to cen-
tral control is intensifying should be withdrawn immedi-
ately. The Government should instead embark on a policy of 
dialogue with representatives of these restive communities. 
Although the Indonesian Police (POLRI) has been sepa-
rated from the TNI, it is still under the control of the De-
fence and Security Minister/Commander-in-chief of the 
TNI. In order to ensure that Polri functions to protect citi-
zens and not to restrict legitimate social or political protest, 
the Government should immediately place the force under a 
civilian authority. Police training should be overhauled, 
ending the militarist ideology that now dominates. * 
continuation from page 23 of the repatriation of the refugees but as yet, this has not 
proaching the camps by hostile militias on guard and report amounted to more than a few thousand a week. A small 
that from what they could observe, the refugees were living number have been airlifted and sea transportation is now 
in appalling conditions and in constant fear of their militia being used to take home two thousand refugees on each 
captors. voyage, mainly from around Kupang. But complications 
Food is in short supply, the refugees are living .under have arisen because many are reluctant to reveal their true 
plastic sheets with no sleeping mats and medical facilities wishes. 
are almost non-existent, according to two Indonesian child- The Indonesian authorities have started issuing the refu-
protection activists who managed to gain access to six of the gees with cards indicating whether they wish to go home, to 
smaller camps. After a five-day study in mid-October, they remain in West Timor or to be transmigrated. This is an 
confirmed that more than three hundred infants had died of unworkable scheme as the refugees are afraid of reprisals 
easily curable diseases in these camps and warned that the from the militias if they reveal that they want to go home. 
death rate would soon explode because the rains were now A growing number of refugees camped near the border 
making the camps uninhabitable. They also expressed alarm have started making their own way back to their villages on 
at the removal of at least forty children to Bali and Jakarta, foot, apparently having been able to evade the militias. 
fearing that they would become victims of economic ex-
ploitation, probably in the sex trade. Sixty per cent of the The most hopeful sign is that the top leadership of the 
people in the camps were children, many without parents or TNI now appear to be distancing themselves from the mili-
relatives and there were hardly any men or women between tias, all part of the battle for power now underway between 
15 and 30; most of the rest were elderly or infirm. the top brass. Reflecting this shift, the TNI has responded 
positively to approaches from the UNHCR to free the camps 
Equally alarming are reports that thousands of refugee of militia control. If this tendency wins out over the efforts 
families have been transported to other parts of Indonesia as of the likes of Major-General Adam Damiri mentioned 
part of Jakarta 's notorious transmigration programme. It has above, the repatriation trickle could tum into a flood of hu-
been impossible to discover how many have been moved manity. But unless this happens fast, many refugees will fall 
and where they have been taken. victim to the atrocious conditions as the rains flood the 
Repatriation little more than a trickle · camps, causing diseases like typhus to sweep through the 
The UN refugee agency, the UNHCR, has taken charge camps and result in yet more loss oflife. * 
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East Timor wins its independence 
The people of East Timor have voted overwhelmingly for independence in a ballot conducted by the 
UN on 30 August 1999. Defying an Indonesian army-led campaign of murder and enforced removal 
from their homes, almost the entire population voted. Nearly eighty per cent voted for independence, 
rejecting Indonesia's offer of autonomy. But the announcement of the result unleashed two weeks of 
unprecedented barbarism which only ended when the UN belatedly agreed to foreign armed inter-
vention. 
The 30 August ballot represents an historic turning-
point for the people of East Timor. A month earlier, more 
than 450,000 had registered to vote despite continuing acts 
of terror right across the territory. By then it was abso-
lutely clear that the terror campaign launched in January by 
the Indonesian armed forces, using armed militia as their 
proxies, had failed to terrorise the Timorese into staying 
away from the ballot. Tens of thousands had been driven 
from their villages, pro-independence leaders, activists and 
human rights NGOs had been murdered or forced into 
hiding, almost the entire CNRT leadership had either been 
killed or driven out of the country. Yet even so, when bal-
lot day came, the East Timorese travelled for miles, defy-
ing the terrorists, to cast their votes in favour of independ-
ence. Theirs was a collective act of boundless courage, a 
manifestation of the determination of the people, come 
what may, to bring to an end their nearly 24 years of geno-
cide and suffering under brutal and relentless Indonesian 
rule. 
Woeful security arrangements 
The ballot process was conducted under woefully in-
adequate security arrangements. The accord reached at the 
UN on 5 May between Indonesia and Portugal handed over 
security to the Indonesian police force and left the Indone-
sian army of occupation in place throughout East Timor. 
Attached to the three documents signed by the Indonesian 
and Portuguese foreign ministers was a Memorandum set-
ting out security requirements signed by the UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan. However, this document which called 
for the security forces to act in strict neutrality and said that 
Indonesian armed forces should 'deploy', had no force as 
UN attempts prior to 5 May to seek Indonesian endorse-
ment of this Memorandum collapsed. 
This security arrangement was approved by the UN 
Security Council despite the fact that one month earlier, the 
worst atrocity in East Timor since 1991 had taken place in 
An impressive turnout, almost 99 per cent of the electorate participated in the ballot 
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Liquica, 40 miles west of Dili when armed militiamen, aided 
and abetted by the local army command, had hacked to 
death scores of refugees who were taking refuge in the local 
church. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 152, May 1999] What 
better proof did the UN need that it would be a grave blun-
der to rely on the Indonesian security forces? 
Terror proceeds as the world watches 
The events in East Timor leading up to and following the 
ballot were widely reported around the world as well as in 
Indonesia. As 30 August approached, Dili was inundated 
with foreign journalists and TV crews. Observers came from 
all parts of the globe, including parliamentarians, repres~n­
tatives of the Carter Centre and a 125-strong observer nns-
sion organised by the International Federation for East 
r-F:fif::q::::::,~~E;;;;aiiiiiiiF.=::::::;::=::::::=T===:::;:;====:::::::::;::::::;::;;:::::='.;1 1 Timor (IFET-OP). 
Never before in the long history of East 
Timor' s bitter experience of Indonesian 
occupation had the world' s spotlight shone 
so powerfully. This played a decisive role 
in alerting public opinion in many coun-
tries, forcing governments which had 
shamelessly procrastinated for so long to 
warn the Indonesian authorities that sanc-
tions would be imposed if nothing was done 
to rein in the TNI-backed militias. The 
tragedy is that it took so long for the 
' international community' to respond, 
costing the people of East Timor who had 
already sacrificed 250,000 lives to sacrifice 
yet more thousands. It was not until condi-
tions on the ground had become so intoler-~===----=-___;___;,,,.;_=..;._ --===========---==""'-===~JL' I able that western governments were forced 
to concede that armed international inter-
vention had become inevitable Indonesian Police arriving at Dili airport. They performed woefully as 
the security force and some units took part in the terror of the militia. 
JNAMET, the UN Assistance Mission for East Timor, 
wluch conducted the ballot, had no mandate either to defend 
itself or the population. UNAMET personnel included 261 
civilian police and fifty military liaison officers, all of whom 
were unarmed. Nor did UNAMET have powers of arrest 
and detention; it could do nothing more than report incidents 
to the Indonesian police and leave it to them to act. Despite 
countless killings and kidnappings, well known to the public 
and reported in the media throughout the world, not a single 
member of the militia was arrested and held for questioning. 
By the time the ballot took place, more than 6Q,OOO East 
Timorese had been driven from their villages and were liv-
ing in encampments at the mercy of the TNI-backed militias. 
Numerous attacks were made on local ,electoral offices 
manned by UN officials and local East Timorese staff, while 
the Indonesian police did nothing to protect the victims and 
in some cases participated in the attacks. 
The ballot was to have been held on 8 August. It was 
twice postponed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for 
security reasons and finally took place on 30 August. Al-
though the security situation failed to improve and many, 
including Bishop Belo and East Timor's leading human 
rights NGO, Yayasan HAK, believed that the voting should 
not be held until conditions improved, the ballot went ahead. 
This was in line with the wishes of the CNRT leadership on 
the grounds that further postponement would not help. 
CNRT leader Xanana Gusmao later told an audience of 
NGO activists in London: 
'The people of East Timor have been crying and dying 
for 23 years. We knew there would be more crying and 
dying but we had to accept that sacrifice for the sake of 
having the ballot. ' 
Violence before the ballot 
In the days just prior the ballot, the level of militia 
violence escalated. Their TNI masters had already realised 
that their initial plan to derail the ballot or to persuade the 
population to cast their votes in favoµr of autonomy had 
failed so they started preparing for Plan B to be brought into 
play after the ballot, to uproot the population and wage all-
out violence by destroying everything in revenge for the 
people's overwhelming support for independence. 
A detailed plan to wreak havoc in East Timor once the 
ballot results were announced had been drawn up. Pro-
independence activists and human rights workers had seen 
leaked copies and warned the UN authorities of impeding 
disaster but they were ignored. East Timor' s military com-
mander had said well before the ballot: 'If the pro-
independents do win .. . , all will be destroyed. It will be 
worse than 23 years ago. 'As early as May, a leaked army 
documents ordered that 'massacres should be carried out 
from village to village.. . if the pro-independence support-
ers win.' 
In early July, a letter leaked to NGOs and sent to 
UNAMET from H.R Garnadi, to his boss, General Feisal 
Tanj~g, the.Minister C~rdinator for Political and Security 
Affarrs, outhned the contingency plan in readiness for the 
defeat of the autonomy option. These would include the 
m~ss evacuation of government employees and Indonesian 
nngrants from East Timor, preparations in West Timor for a 
huge influx of evacuees from East Timor and the destruction 
of 'vital facilities' all along the evacuation route. 
Later, citing diplomatic, church and militia sources the 
Australian press reported that 'hundreds of modern as;ault 
rifles, g~enades and mortars are being stockpiled, ready 
for use if the autonomy option is rejected in the ballot box. ' 
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As a foretaste of what was to come, IFET-OP re-
ported on 28 August th~t the 14-day campaign period for 
the ballot 'came to a bloody end Friday .. .. Pro-autonomy 
forces attacked pro-independence groups and individuals 
during the final two days in Dili, while creating an atmos-
phere of terror in a number of locations throughout East 
Timor' . The report documented serious militia attacks in 
several places where its observers were still present. In 
Oecussi, (the enclave on the north coast of West Timor), the 
CNRT office was set ablaze after a night of constant gun-
fire. Eight people were wounded and many were missing. 
The Indonesian police took no action till 7 am. 
In the village of Memo, Maliana (near the border with 
West Tim.or), hundreds of machete-wielding militias carry-
ing home-made rifles attacked villagers, leaving two people 
dead and many wounded. In this case, the Indonesian police 
led the militia attack. UNAMET personnel were forced to 
abandon their office and flee the area. Collusion between the 
militias and the local army commander, Lt-Colonel Burha-
nuddin Siagian, had become so blatant that he was dis-
missed and replaced, at the UN's behest. (Two months ear-
lier, TAPOL had called for his dismissal.) [See also sepa-
rate reports by IFET-OP observers in this issue.] 
In Los Palos in the east of the territory, the CNRT office 
was attacked; the local traditional chief, a known supporter 
of independence, was killed. Police who had been guarding 
the building were nowhere to be seen when the attack was 
launched. 
Responding to calls for the ballot to be called off, 
UNAMET spokesman, David Wimhurst said: 'We are 
locked into the process and we also have a moral obligation 
to allow the people of East Timor to vote. If we give in to 
thuggery, then democracy fails . That cannot be allowed to 
happen.' [The Independent, 27 August] 
The day of the ballot 
Despite this escalation of violence, virtually the entire 
population eligible to vote came to the polling stations. The 
total number of votes cast was 432,287, which was 98.6 per 
cent of the nearly 450,000 who had registered to vote. 
The very sight of thousands of people queuing up, defi-
antly waving their registration papers, was magnificent to 
behold. It quickly became clear that nothing could hold back 
the East Timorese in their determination to cast a vote that 
would bring to an end the much-reviled Indonesian occupa-
tion. An East Timorese man from Luidaha village in the 
hills high above Liquica, expressed these sentiments when 
he said that he would not be deterred from voting. Luis dos 
Santos told a journalist: 'They say they will burn our houses 
if we vote for independence, but we are going to do it any-
way. The fear only makes us stronger.' He said he had 
made the long trek to the polling station despite frequent 
visits from the local militia, the recent kidnapping of a vil-
lager and the murder of a religious leader a few weeks ear-
lier. [The Times, 30 August] 
After casting their votes, the voters in many places did 
not return home but fled to the hills to escape the violence 
they knew would be unleashed. 
Xanana Gusmao, the East Timorese leader, who was still 
under house arrest on the day of the ballot, cast his vote in 
Jakarta. Calling on his countrymen and women to contain 
their emotions and prevent further bloodshed, he said: 'Let 
EASTTIMOR 
us vote, Let us all vote. Let us not be afraid East Timar 
depends on the courage and the conviction we demonstrate 
today. ' [The Times, 31 August] 
In Mahana, one of the worst areas of militia violence 
thousands had gathered hours before the polls opened at 
6.30am. 'They came from all over the area, most of them 
on foot .. .. In a tiny mountain church, 600 people materi-
alised on Sunday night after an epic trek through the 
hills.(They were) the parents, wives and children of the 
guerrilla army, FALINTIL. (After) queuing for hours and 
voting ... , they evaporated once again into the hills. [The 
Independent, 31 August] 
East Timorese leaders voting 
in different places. Bishop 
Belo (top left) voted in Dili, 
Xanana Gusmao in Jakarta 
while Ramos Horta (bottom) 
voted in Sydney. 
Barbarism in the wake of the ballot 
In the six days between the ballot and the announcement 
of the result on 4 September, the violence continued un-
abated. Militia spokesmen and members of the Indonesian 
government started accusing the UN of bias, claiming that 
they would submit proof of vote-rigging but the three-person 
independent Electoral Commission said they had no reason 
to doubt the legitimacy of the ballot. · The pro-Indonesian 
forces were not planning to mount a challenge of voting pro-
cedures; they were readying themselves to ravage the coun-
try and uproot the entire population. 
The several thousand East Timorese who had been re-
cruited to assist the UN as drivers, translators and clerical 
assistants were targeted and several were killed in militia 
attacks immediately after the ballot. 
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where thousands of people were taking refuge, was under 
A large UNAMET vehicle on its way back from Ermera siege, the office of the International Red Cross had been 
to Dili, carrying ballot boxes, was ambushed and held for attacked and its personnel forced to evacuate and 
many hours. The ambush followed the overnight murder of a UNAMET's central compound was surrounded by troops 
local UN staff member, Joao Lopes Gomes, in Atsabe, Er- and militiamen, with the constant sound of gunfire. The 
mera. [Jakarta Post, 1 September] Two UNAMET local UNAMET compound remained under siege for ten days. 
staff were killed and five others were missing in Maliana 
after militiamen set fire to dozens of houses, forcing the UN On 6 September, East Timorese taking refuge in a 
contingent to evacuate. church premises nearby were attacked by militiamen. Hun-
dreds fled to the compound and had to climb over razor-wire 
Two days after the ballot, following a clash between to gain access; many, including small children suffered seri-
armed militias and unarmed pro-independence groups, seri- ous cuts. The compound had now become sanctuary to sev-
ous violence erupted in Dili, during which a young Timorese eral hundred UN personnel, more than 2,000 East Timorese 
was shot dead by an Indonesian policeman. A series of and a number of foreign journalists forced to flee their hotel 
photographs showing how the murdered man was chased, _ __ ...., accommodation. When orders were received from the 
A TN/ soldier and militia roaming in the streets of Dili 
shot at and then lay dead on the road was published in many 
western papers [The Daily Telegraph, l September]. 
Nearby, the BBC correspondent in Jakarta, Jonathan Head, 
was chased and beaten; he survived thanks to the protection 
of a tnilitiaman. Meanwhile, a few feet away, a Timorese 
man was hacked to death. 
It was becoming clear that journalists were being tar-
geted. Many foreign journalists were ordered by their agen-
cies to leave but others decided to stay. Virtually all Indone-
sian journalists were driven out of East Timor on the pretext 
that they were 'in favour of independence' . This had the 
effect of curtailing comprehensive reporting in the Indone-
sian press of the true nature of the barbarism that was about 
to unfold. 
As the violence continued to escalate, calls for armed 
international intervention intensified. Already for weeks, 
there had been reports of thousands of Australian troops 
deployed in Darwin, in readiness for use in East Timor. 
All hell breaks loose 
Following the announcement of the ballot result on 4 
September showing that 78 .5 per cent. of the population 
were in favour of independence, the pro-Indonesian forces 
unleashed a reign of terror in Dili and the other cities. The 
tnilitias rampaged through Dili, starting fires, shooting in-
UN in New York for all UNAMET personnel to leave 
Dili, the UNAMET personnel in the compound, en-
couraged by the journalists, refused to do so, knowing 
that the East Timorese whom they left behind would 
be killed without mercy. 
The attack on Bishop Belo's residence cost at least 
25 lives. The Bishop was taken away by the police 
and flown to Baucau for his own safety. The follow-
ing day, he left for Darwin, while Bishop Basilio do 
Nascimento in Baucau had to flee during an attack on 
his residence and evacuated to the countryside. He 
said in phone interview that intervention was urgent 
or else 'the people of East Timor will all die' 
Australian journalist John Martinkus described the 
situation in Dili as 'political cleansing' . 'Government 
soldiers and pro-Indonesia militias move through the 
town shooting anyone who refuses to leave and setting 
fire to their homes.' He said he and other journalists 
had been trapped in their rooms by sustained gunfire. 
He quoted a New Zealand journalist who visited the 
pro-independence suburb of Becora. 'All night they 
came back, Indonesian soldiers driving up and down the 
street, shooting, firing rocket-propelled grenades, bazookas 
and talking through a loud-speaker telling those who were 
still there to evacuate.' A wounded man from Becora who 
reached the Motael clinic in Dili said he had seen heads on 
top of sticks lined along the street. A doctor at the clinic 
said: 'We had ten gunshot wounds here yesterday, some to 
the head. These people are not aiming to scare people but 
kill them.'[The Express, 7 September] 
As the rampaging increased, the world's press ackno-
wledged what had been known by observers of East Timor 
for months, that there was a direct link between the Indone-
sian armed forces (TNI) on the one hand and the militias on 
the other. The Sydney Morning Herald (6 September) and 
The Guardian (7 September) made public leaked documents 
prepared by UNAMET staff giving proof of 'joint opera-
tions' between army, police and militia, including burning of 
houses and attacks on civilians. According to The Guardian, 
the documents specifically accused the TNI of fomenting 
violence. 'They cite specific examples in towns outside Dili, 
including a threat to burn down a UN compound by a militia 
leader who said he was acting on instructions from an Indo-
. . ' nes1an major . 
Bishop Ximenes Belo said from Darwin that it was 
'necessary to protect the people, otherwise many of them 
will die'. 
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Armed intervention in sight at last 
With the situation in East Timor reaching a new low the 
UN Security Council held an emergency session and 'sent 
five ambassadors to Jakarta for top-level discussions. 
A Security Council resolution condemned the 
'uncontrolled violence' in East Timor, but as the Financial 
Times' Sander Thoenes wrote (7 September), to call the 
br~akdo.wn of law and order uncontrolled is profoundly 
misleadmg. 'It's authorised anarchy' , he quoted a diplomat 
as saying. 'The military is organising it. ' [This was one of 
the last pieces Thoenes ever wrote. A week later he was 
slain in Dili by members of the Indonesian army. A month 
later, the army in Jakarta was still refusing to allow officers 
to go to Dili for investigations into his death.] 
EASTTIMOR 
in the Pacific region during a stopover in Hawaii Clinton 
said: 'It is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding 
and abetting the militia violence. This is simply unaccept-
able. The actions of the Indonesian military stand in stark 
contrast to the commitments they have given to the interna-
tional community.' [International Herald Tribune, 11-12 
September] 
He also threatened to suspend all economic assistance 
( implying that IMF and World Bank aid was included ) if 
Indonesia continued to resist East Timor's desire for inde-
p~ndence and announced that the US would be cutting ties 
with the Indonesian military and halting the delivery of 
military equipment to Indonesia . 
The APEC meeting became the venue for international 
crisis talks about East Timor as horrific reports filling the 
TV screens and the front pages of the world's press. None 
doubted anymore that the TNI was the cause of the barbarity 
ravaging East Timor, uprooting the entire population and 
. Meanwhile in Jakarta, President Habibie was forced by 
W1ranto to declare martial law in East Timor. The TNI 
commander in chief appointed Major-General Kiki Syahna-
kri, a former military commander in East Timor, as martial 
law. ~xecutor and announced that three more battalions (in 
~dditlo~al to two sent a week earlier) would be deployed 
immediately. By now, Wiranto was rn==================::---;;;;::=:-:::=::-:::--:--::--::::-:=::::===--=--=---=-==--::::-i 
facing a calamity in East Timor of 
his own making, a Frankenstein 
monster of his own creation that had 
now reached unmanageable propor-
tions. He apparently hoped that mar-
tial law would rein in the militiamen 
but it only made matters worse. 
World 
prevails 
public opinion 
World leaders were about to 
gather in New Zealand for a meeting 
of APEC. There was much wringing 
of hands as news from East Timor 
grew worse by the hour but the bot-
tom lime was that no one would 
agree to send in an armed interna-
tional force unless Indonesia gave its ~;::-::-:=;-:--;.--:;:--;:;;;:-. --:- -.-~;;.:.:.:=:;::;;;::====;;==:::;::;::::=====~~~~ 
1 
'T d th . , .d Key people in the Timor tragedy, General Wiranto, General Feisal Tandg"ung 
approva . o o o erw1se, sa1 . . ~ . 
Al d D A tr 1
. , ti and Ali Alatas. Wiranto is no longer aefence minister and the other two are out 
exan er owner, us a ia s or-
eign minister, 'would mean going to war.' Of course there conducting a scorched-earth policy to destroy all the towns 
were other considerations. The fear of souring relations with and villages. . 
Jakarta was uppermost in the minds of many world leaders. ,h~al~s for armed foreign intervention continued to inte~-
East Timorese leader Xanana Gusmao, who had just s~y' with some commentators asking how many more East 
been released from house arrest and had taken refuge in the Timorese would have to die before the international commu-
British embassy in Jakarta, made a passionate plea during a nity took the only step that could save the nation from ex-
meeting with the five Security Council ambassadors: term~nation. _Bu~ members of the Indonesian government 
continued to ms1st that foreign intervention was not accept-
'!/ the outside world does not intervene to stop· the vio- able. 
Jenee, it will be too late and genocide will be committed I 
kneel before the Security Council. I kneel before the inter-
national community If you wait, even for a few more days, 
then you will later enter an empty land and the interna-
tional community will be faced with another genocide. ' 
[The Independent, IO September] 
With the world's press brimming over with horror reports 
from East Timor and calls coming from everywhere for in-
ternational intervention, the world leaders were forced to 
act. En route to New Zealand, President Clinton declared 
that the attacks on the UN compound in Dili were 'simply 
unacceptable'. After being briefed by the US commander 
On 11 September, the five UN ambassadors visited Dili 
accompanied by General Wiranto. They found much of th~ 
capital in ruins, burnt down by militia and their cohorts in 
the army and the police. The devastation they saw and the 
visit to the besieged UN compound horrified them and left 
Wiranto unable to withstand any longer the threats of eco-
nomic sanctions. Interviewed on CNN, he now admitted that 
'the time had probably come to accept an armed interna-
tional presence'. 
The following day, the Indonesian cabinet held crisis 
talks, at the end of which President Habibie announced that 
he had notified Kofi Annan that an international force would 
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?efore had been saying such a thing was unacceptable, was 
instructed to fly to New York to finalised arrangements. 
Three days later, the Security Council adopted a resolution 
endorsing the dispatch of a multinational force of 8,000 
troops to East Timor without further delay. 
INTERFET takes over 
With thousands of Australian troops already in Darwin, 
troops of the International Force for East Timor INTER-
' FET, were rapidly deployed, landing in Dili on 20 Septem-
ber under the command of an Australian general, Major-
General Peter Cosgrove. Half the force of 8,000 troops will 
be from Australia along with a small contingent of British 
Gurkhas, a contingent of New Zealand troops plus a size-
able force from Thailand and the Philippines to ensure an 
Asian presence. The US said it would only be willing to 
contribute non-combat troops as well as a couple of war-
ships. 
Two weeks after the arrival of INTERFET troops, the 
martial ~aw commander withdrew while the vast majority of 
Indonesian troops were pulled out of East Timor, to the jeers 
of those East Timorese who were in Dili to 'see them off'. 
Formally speaking, the powers of the multinational forne on 
questions of arrest and detention would remain limited until 
Indonesia's supreme assembly, the MPR, formally re-
nounces all further claims to East Timor which is expected 
to happen before 21 October. Thereafter, INTERFET will 
be transformed into a UN Peace-Keeping Force under a UN 
administration known as the UN Transitional Administra-
tion for East Timor, UNTAET. 
For the first week of INTERFET operations, militiamen 
and their TNI cohorts continued to raze buildings in Dili, 
including their own barracks. Like virtually every other 
town in East Timor, Dili was by now almost completely 
flattened and emptied of inhabitants. Fearful of the brutali-
ties of the TNI/militia, almost the entire populace had taken 
to the hills. By now it was estimated that at least half the 
population of East Timor had fled to the mountainous inte-
rior, with meagre food supplies and no shelter. 
With far fewer troops in East Timor than the more than 
40,000 K-FOR troops in Kosovo, that has a terrain that is 
smaller and much less rugged than East Timor, INTER-
FET's progress has been painfully slow. At risk are the lives 
of those hundreds of thousands of people driven from their 
villages. Aid agencies arrived in Dili with plans to distribute 
food but were unable to proceed until troops secured the 
interior. By mid-October, there were fears that conditions 
would rapidly deteriorate once the rains began. The risk of 
widespread disease and starvation among people already 
ravaged by ill-health and traumatised by months of brutality 
cannot be under-estimated. 
Many parts of the interior are under the control of the 
East Timorese armed resistance, the F ALINTIL, whose 
bases have been inundated with thousands of fleeing East 
Timorese. In several places, F ALINTIL forces have en-
countered members of the international force, only to be met 
by demands that they surrender their weapons. This met 
with a stern rebuff by Xanana Gusmao who insisted that are 
not 'bandits' but have been waging a legitimate struggle for 
independence. 
Securing E Timor against attack from the 
west 
INTERFET is also likely to concentrate at least half its 
troops on securing the 200-mile border with West Timor. 
This is critical to the success of its operations as militia 
leaders warned that they planned to re-muster their forces in 
West Timor in preparation for an attack. Major-General 
Adam Damiri, the military commander for the Nusatenggara 
Timor region which includes West Timor has publicly ad-
vised members of the TNI who wish to join forces with the 
militias to make sure to discard their army uniforms. With 
such blatant incitement coming from the army officer in 
charge, the militia threats should not be taken lightly. 
Damiri has played an active role in the recruitment, arming 
and training of the militia force since the start of the Op-
erasi Sapu Jagat campaign at the beginning of 1999 (see 
separate item). 
In the first week of October, INTERFET troops were 
engaged in brief skirmishes with militia gangs along the 
southern stretch of the border with West Timor during 
which three militiamen were killed and scores taken pris-
oner. On 10 October, a clash occurred further north between 
the international force and members of the TNI who fired 
w~ng shots. Australian troops returned fire, killing one 
pohce officer and wounding two others. While the Indone-
sians claimed that the Australian troops had entered Indone-
sian territory, the INTERFET commander insisted that ac-
cording to his map, this was not true. Ironically, while the 
Australians were using a 1992 Indonesian army map, the 
TNI officer had a map drawn in the 1920s when Indonesia 
was still a Dutch colony. 
Indonesia revokes integration decree 
Indonesia's supreme assembly, the MPR, was required 
by the 5 May 1999 accord to relinquish its claim to East 
Timor in the event that the ballot resulted in the rejection of 
autonomy. In the run-up to the plenary session on 15-20 
October, moves were afoot to adopt a resolution that would 
delay r~vocation of the MPR's decision in 1978 integrating 
East T1mor. A draft resolution was circulating, that would 
have put the decision on hold until UNAMET had 
'sati~fa~t~rily' answered charges that the ballot was rigged 
and insisting that Portugal amend its Constitution with re-
gard to East Timor. 
However, it soon became clear that most fractions in the 
assembly wanted to see an end to the issue. In the end it 
was the TNI fraction that pressed for the 1978 decree to' be 
revoked immediately. Whatever their motives, this paved the 
way for the decree to be revoked without opposition. * 
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How many people died ? 
It is not yet possible to make a reasonably accurate 
estimate of the number of people killed in the weeks before 
and after the ballot. 
As the events unfolded, there were numerous reports of 
killings in villages and towns up and down the country. 
Local CNRT leaders were slain in many places, local 
government officials suspected of pro-independence 
sympathies were killed, local UN staff were targeted. Scores 
of villagers especially in the western regions were 
slaughtered in local massacres. One of the worst massacres 
occurred in Suai where three priests were killed and scores 
of people taking refuge in the church were slain. While only 
a few mass graves have so far been discovered in the area, 
some local residents say that the gang responsible for the 
slaughter later burned the bodies and threw the ashes in a 
nearby lake. If true, this shows that not only were the 
killings systematic but also the disposal of the evidence. 
An estimated 25 people died while taking refuge in the 
Bishop's residence in Dili on 6 September. In several 
places, local priests and nuns were killed. In late September, 
the week after Interfet troops arrived, a group of Catholic 
aid workers and nuns, together with an Indonesian 
journalist, nine people in all, were killed on a trip to deliver 
food and medicines from Baucau to Los Palos. 
Some of these atrocities have been well documented, 
others have not and are still being investigated. On 21 
September, the Financial Times journalist in Jakarta was 
killed on the outskirts of Dili. 
After Interfet forces reached Dili on 20 September, a 
deep well containing an unspecified number of bodies was 
found. Scores of people were reportedly killed in Oecussi in 
mid October, before. Interfet troops had landed in the 
enclave. 
. There were also numerous reports that young men among 
the tens of thousands of people driven from East Timor into 
continuation from page 3 0 
law includes provisions that effectively cancel this out. 
Although it provides for human rights abusers to be tried 
before a human rights court composed of an independent 
panel of judges, it allows for exceptions in cases where the 
suspects are from the armed forces or the police by empow-
ering the judiciary to establish an ad hoc court composed of a 
single judge. This clearly allows for members of the security 
forces (the very ones who are certain to be suspects in such 
cases) to be tried by judges from their own force, defeating 
the whole purpose of having perpetrators indicted by an inde-
pendent tribunal. Far from ensuring that such criminals are 
called to account, it actually ensures their protection. 
West Timor aboard ships were separated from the women, 
children and elderly people, shot and their bodies thrown 
overboard. Observers who later were able to visit refugee 
centres in West Timor noted that there were hardly any men. 
People along the coast near Batugade close to the border 
with West Timor, have reported bodies being washed ashore 
or finding people' s belongings on the beaches while people 
in Dili have begun to dig up bodies that were buried in the 
beach. 
In some cases, people reported to have been killed have 
subsequently turned up alive. This was the case with 
Xanana Gusmao' s father. Although reported to have been 
killed he was under protection in a Catholic sisters' refuge 
in Dili. The head of the Caritas International programme in 
Dili also survived, following reports that he had been killed 
with other members of his team. 
It is not known how many people died while being 
forcibly evacuated to West Timor. Nor is it possible to 
estimate how many people, driven to the mountains without 
adequate food supplies and shelter, may have died from 
exposure, starvation or other diseases. A group of 
Indonesian investigators who visited a few refugee camps in 
West Timor in mid-October reported that 312 infants had 
died because of lack of medicines and predicted that many 
malnourished children would soon die because of the heavy 
rains and lack of decent shelter. 
With the entire country thrown into a state of chaos it 
could take months, perhaps years, before the true death toll 
in the months before and after the ballot can be known. All 
we can say at the moment is that tho~sands died, and that 
most of the bodies will never be recovered. 
They will be mourned as the victims of a tragedy which 
could have been prevented, had the UN and in particular 
members of the Security Council faced up to the reality of 
wh~t t~e Indonesian armed forces were capable of doing in 
their blmd attempt to hang on to East Timor. * 
The law also rules out any investigation of abuses perpe-
trated prior to the enactment of the law. This lets off scores of 
torturers and murderers who were active during the three dec-
ades of Suharto's New Order and right up to the end of the 
Indonesian army's murderous campaign in East Timor, as 
well as numerous grave abuses in Aceh and West Papua. 
The Habibie Government and the TNI were so anxious to 
have this law on the statute book before an international tribu-
nal could start to function that it was enacted by a Perpu, a 
presidential decree in lieu of a law; it would have taken 
months or even years to have it enacted by parliament. * 
TAPOL Bulletin No.154/155, November 1999 11 
!EASTTIMOR 
Nationalist backlash and the Indonesian press 
While Indonesian troops and their militia proxies were turning East Timor into a des?la_te wastelan.d 
and driving hundreds of thousands of people from their homes, the general public in Indone~ia 
heard little about what was going on. They have been fed a stream of lies about the ballot being 
rigged, Inter/ et atrocities and distorted reporting of the clashes between the foreign troops and 
armed militiamen. Military intelligence is clearly to blame for this dis-information. 
With a few honourable exceptions such as the leading 
English-language daily, The Jakarta Post, the afternoon 
daily, Suara Pembaruan, and to a lesser extent Kompas, 
almost all Indonesian newspapers have blamed the UN for 
Indonesia's resounding defeat in the 30 August ballot. 
Steeped for 23 years in the lies spread during the Su-
harto dictatorship, it came as a profound shock to most In-
donesians that the East Timorese could be 'so ungrateful' as 
to vote so heavily against remaining with Indonesia. For 
years, the general public in Indonesia has been led to believe 
that Indonesia showered 'our youngest province' with un-
limited amounts of money to build roads, bridges and 
schools while hearing nothing about the systematic violence 
in East Timor throughout the occupation. 
The UN was accused of rigging the votes and promoting 
the cause of independence in the way the ballot was con-
ducted while Australia was vilified for taking the lead in the 
multinational force that landed in Dili on 20 September. 
Encouraged by a hostile Indonesian press, Australia bashing 
became the order of the day while the towns of East Timor 
were being razed to the ground. The NU leader, Abdur-
rachman Wahid (who was soon to become President) whose 
opinions are always widely reported, joined in the xenopho-
bic chorus, accusing Australia of turning against Indonesia 
and calling for relations with Australia to be 'cooled'. He 
also complained that the international community and cer-
tain NGOs were deliberately 'cornering' Indonesia with 
'biased reporting' about East Timor. We can only conclude 
that he was being fed a pack oflies by his close advisers. 
Dis-information by military intelligence 
This poisoned political atmosphere was the result of a 
campaign of dis-information organised by military intelli-
gence. Until the end of August, there were many Indonesian 
journalists in Dili. The military authorities were not happy 
about this and started accusing the Indonesian press corps of 
being biased in favour of independence. On 2 September, 
three days before the worst violence was unleashed, they 
were warned by the military that their safety could not be 
guaranteed and they should leave immediately. Most of them 
took the warning seriously, leaving the field clear for the 
state news agency, Antara, whose Dili-based journalist is 
widely believed to be working for BAIS, the military intelli-
gence body. 
Scanning the pages of one leading regional daily, Was-
pada which relies heavily on Antara stories, during the first 
half of September, we found no reports about the devasta-
tion underway in East Timor. Another regional daily, Bali 
Pos, filed reports about the scorched earth policy in East 
Timor on 6, 7, and 8 September but this was one of the few 
the exceptions to the general pattern. 
Once INTERFET had landed, reports began to appear 
about alleged atrocities by Australian troops. They were 
said to have captured and tortured four militiamen. One was 
allegedly killed and his body stuffed into an oil barrel and 
burned. They were also accused of burning an Indonesian 
flag. The stories have never been substantiated but were 
widely, and repeatedly, told in Indonesian newspapers. 
Later, when INTERFET troops were involved in an 
armed clash with Indonesian security forces at a border 
point near the village of Motain, during which an Indonesian 
police officer was killed, it was widely, and repeatedly, re-
ported in Indonesia that the foreign troops had violated the 
border even though the Indonesian officer involved in the 
incident acknowledged that this was not true. Although the 
incident was later resolved between INTERFET and the 
TNI, the accusations continued to reverberate. 
The result of this media distortion is that the Indonesian 
armed forces have emerged unscathed by their horrific ac-
tions in East Timor. The only figure to have been vilified for 
Indonesia's 'loss' of East Timor is President Habibie for 
having suggested that East Timor should been given the op-
tion of deciding on its future. The truth is of course that it 
was the more than two decades of army violence that re-
sulted in Indonesia's resounding defeat on 30 August. * 
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The Kopassus-militia alliance 
The arrest of ten men wearing Kopassus outfit by INTERFET forces is proof of the overwhelming 
involvement of this elite force in the terror and violence in East Timor during the past two decades. 
The two weeks of violence that ravaged East Timor after the results of the referendum were an-
nounced was the responsibility of Kopassus and their proxies, the militia gangs. 
Much has been written about the Kopassus/militia alli-
ance and its role as a killing machine but nobody, perhaps 
not even the armed forces (TNI) leadership in Jakarta, 
imagined that it would descend to such a level of barbarity. 
In just two weeks, these murderous bandits had driven virtu-
ally the entire East Timorese population from their homes, 
killing hundreds or perhaps thousands of defenceless people. 
This can only be understood in the context of the structural 
relationship between the militia forces and their evil mas-
ters, the Kopassus elite troops . 
Kopassus and East Timor 
The involvement of Kopassus, the elite red-beret force, 
in East Timor started before the invasion. General Benny 
Murdani who planned the invasion was a senior officer of 
RPKAD as Kopassus was then known. Its role intensified as 
it became apparent that the resistance was far stronger than 
had been anticipated and it would take longer than expected 
to subjugate the East Timorese. Kopassus became the key 
player in the war against the East Timorese. 
The average territorial soldier is not trained for the type 
of war needed to counter a guerrilla force like F alintil, the 
armed wing of the East Timorese resistance. Specially 
trained combat forces like Kostrad, the army's strategic 
command, and Kopassus were needed. Since 1975, every 
Kopassus soldier and officer has served, often repeatedly, in 
East Timor. During the eighties and mid-nineties, a tour of 
combat duty in East Timor was the stepping-stone for an 
officer's career prospects. Everyone who reached the top 
was an East Timor veteran, in most cases with a Kopassus 
background. By the early nineties the armed forces HQ was 
stuffed with high-ranking Kopassus officers. 
East Timor as training ground 
Kopassus soldiers are known to be tough. One initiation 
rite is to travel from the north coast to the south coast of 
Java armed only with a knife, survival training that is mod-
elled on SAS in the UK and the Green Berets in the US. 
After the invasion, East Timor became the training and 
battle ground for Kopassus which sustained many casualties 
in encounters with F alintil. A retired TNI general recently 
estimated that ten or eleven thousand Indonesian soldiers 
have fallen in battle which explains why Kopassus have 
behaved with such brutality in East Timor. 
Kopassus troops arriving at the airport 
Even in calm periods, serving in East Timor has been 
comparable to doing service in a war-zone. Every East 
Timorese was regarded as a suspect; the culture of violence 
was more extreme than anywhere else though lately the 
situation in Aceh has moved in the same direction. After 
serving in East Timor, soldiers are psychologically de-
briefed before returning to normal duties in Indonesia. Such 
brutal treatment, while used occasionally in Indonesia, is 
what the East Timorese have always had to endure. 
Up to the early eighties the basic Kopassus credo was 
never to take prisoners: all captives were tortured, interro-
gated and killed. Until very recently, Kopassus had its own 
interrogation centres throughout East Timor. These SGI 
centres were regarded as chambers of horror by the East 
Timorese. It was only after the 1983 talks between the East 
Timorese resistance forces and the Indonesian military that 
Kopassus reluctantly agreed to hand their captives over for 
detention and trial. 
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The dual command structure 
The TNI leadership created a special command structure 
for the military occupation of East Timor. Combat opera-
tions were handled by Kostrad and Kopassus under orders 
from Jakarta while the territorial structure, as elsewhere in 
Indonesia, came under the regional command. 
The special combat structure came into being soon after 
the invasion. In 1976 a special command called Kohankam 
was set up; its name changed in 1984 to Koopskam and in 
1989 to Kolakops. In 1993 Kolakops was dissolved but its 
functions were secretly transferred to Kopassus Group 3. 
The combat structure has always been dominant though 
operational strategies have changed. In the first fifteen years 
of the occupation TNI launched many large-scale military 
operations to obliterate the guerrillas but Falintil has sur-
vived, thanks to its deep roots in society and its strategy of 
mobile guerrilla warfare, maintaining no permanent base. 
For many years East Timor was the only place where Indo-
nesian troops and Kopassus soldiers could practise their 
combat training. 
By the early nineties the resistance had developed a 
strong urban base known as the clandestine front, consisting 
mainly of young people. They took many actions against the 
forces of occupation, frequently attracting world attention. 
Gradually, the command structure switched, combating not 
only the guerrillas but also the urban resistance. The clan-
destine network also spread to several Indonesian university 
cities. 
The main thrust of Kopassus operations is counter-
insurgency. Everyone is seen as a potential target, the peo-
ple in the bush as well as civilians in the towns. Creating 
militia forces was a logical consequence of this strategy, to 
get Timorese to fight Timorese. 
Kopassus Groups 3, 4 and 5 
Initially Kopassus consisted ' of three groups. Groups 1 
and 2 were predominantly combat troops similar to combat 
troops anywhere in the world. Group 3 came into being in 
1963, with additional training in counter insurgency, in-
cluding interrogation techniques and torture methods. The 
SGI centres in East Timor were attached to Group 3. In-
creasingly the two lines of command in East Timor were 
headed by commanders from Kopassus' Group 3, with many 
lower-level territorial commanders also coming from the 
same force. In other words, Kopassus represented the core 
of the army of occupation. 
After Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, became Kopassus 
commander in 1995, he increased the strength of Kopassus 
to 7,000 troops by 1998, almost double its earlier size. 
Prabowo 's prowess as an elite force officer reached his peak 
in the closing years of the Suharto era, a period of huge la-
bour strikes and demonstrations as pressure gre for Suharto 
to stand down. To deal with the growing unrest, Prabowo 
established Groups 4 and 5, most of whose members were 
recruited from Group 3. Group 4 and 5 members were 
trained in German anti-terrorist methods, Prabowo being 
one of the few Indonesian officers to train with the prestig-
ious GSG anti-terrorist squad in Germany. One distinctive 
feature of Groups 4 and 5 are that the members do not wear 
uniforms. 
Group 4 focuses on infiltrating opposition groups and act 
as provocateurs. They grow their hair long, dress shabbily, 
set up secret cells and sometimes carry out assassinations. 
Terror and violence are their stock in trade and they fre-
quently recruit criminals as auxiliaries. 
Group 5 is not unlike Group 4 but was set up to kidnap 
or kill influential opposition figures in the closing years of 
Suharto's rule. In August 1998 Prabowo admitted to a mili-
tary investigation team that he was responsible for a number 
of kidnappings and disappearances. He and two other senior 
Kopassus officers were removed from their posts, Prabowo 
was dismissed from the army and 11 Kopassus Group 5 
members were tried and given minor sentences. They were 
known as Tim Mawar (Rose Team). 
Militia groups, trained and armed by Kopassus 
The activities of Groups 4 and 5 are shrouded in mys-
tery. After Prabowo's dismissal, several Group 4 and 5 
platoons were reported as having defected. Since then, there 
has been talk of 'phantom' troops operating in Aceh and 
Maluku, which suggests that the 'disappeared' Kopassus 
platoons may still be operating though no one knows who is 
in command. 
Rotten to the core 
Kopassus, formerly called the RPKAD and then Kopas-
sandha, is elite in every sense. One Kopassus soldier is said 
to equal four average soldiers. In the early sixties RPKAD 
was seen as the army's best unit, modelled along the lines of 
KST, a Dutch elite unit. But later on, ·the US green berets 
became the model as Kopassus troops relied on the US for 
all its training. 
Throughout its history its men have enjoyed superior 
treatment, better uniforms and barracks, more high tech 
equipment and higher pay with extra bonuses. It was 
Prabowo' s dream to provide every Kopassus soldier with 
high tech training, with a Heckler and Koch semi-automatic 
rifle and a hand-held computer for communications. 
At the start of the Suharto era in October 1965 Briga-
dier-General Sarwo Edhy, the RPKAD command~r was 
ordered by General _Suharto to ~eash_ a_ wave of killhtgs in 
Central Java; Muslllll gangs quickly Jomed, spreading the 
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ordered by General Suharto to unleash a wave of killings in 
Central Java; Muslim gangs quickly joined, spreading the 
killings to East Java. Between half a million and one million 
people died in the slaughter. 
This was when violence and impunity became the hall-
mark of the New Order. The RPKAD had become a killing 
machine that could do what it liked without taking the con-
sequences. Assured of impunity, Kopassus soldiers got into 
the habit of behaving like animals in war zones like East 
Timor and Aceh. 
Financial bonanzas 
The years of rapid economic growth opened up new vis-
tas for Kopassus soldiers. Businesses in the big cities 
needed protection and hired the services of Kopassus sol-
diers; partnerships were formed in the country's industrial 
and business centres between these troops and organised 
crime. They also recruited local thugs, including members of 
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POL Bulletin No. 153, July 1999]. Habibie's decision in 
January to hold a referendum in East Timor led to the crea-
tion of militia units in all the thirteen districts (kabupaten) . 
Most of the 11,000 militiamen were trained in West Timor 
by Group 4 and 5 Kopassus members. M~st members of the 
militias were non-Timorese from other parts of Indonesia, 
the dregs of society, including criminals especially released 
from prison. 
These new militia gangs or death squads included Besi 
Merah Putih (red-and-white steel) in Liquisa, Aitarak 
(thorn) in Dili, Dadurus in Maliana and Mahidi (dead or 
alive with integration) in Ainaro. These are the thugs who, 
with their Kopassus masters, were responsible for the kill-
ings and devastation that grew in intensity during 1999 and 
came to a terrifying climax in September 1999. 
Sapu Jagad-1 fails 
There were two military op-
erations called Sapu Jagad 
(universal sweep). The first 
was launched in January 1999; 
the second took over after the 
result of the referendum was 
announced· on 4 September. 
Operasi Sapu Jagad I tar-
geted the CNRT, the pro-
independence umbrella organi-
sation, and influential members . ·: · 
of society, the aim being tO: · 
intimidate the population into 
supporting autonomy. It was 
hoped that months of violence 
would discourage people from 
registering and voting, to show· 
More than two-thirds of the population of East Timor were forced to flee 
. ' 
to the world that the East 
Timorese rejected the referen-
dum. Most TNI officers actu-
ally believed that Sapu Jagad 
would work. 
the notorious youth group Pemuda Pancasila, for the more 
distasteful political jobs. Kopassus involvement with organ-
ised crime and the mafia became structural. Leading busi-
nessmen, the cronies of Suharto, hired Kopassus soldiers as 
bodyguards or chauffeurs. The private bodyguard of forestry 
tycoon Bob Hasan was from Kopassus. 
Little is known about how Prabowo ·financed the rapid 
expansion of Kopassus or the expanded training and educa-
tion programme for Kopassus officers who were sent to uni-
versities in Europe and the US. One likely source for this 
and later for secret Kopassus operations, including the re-
cent operations in East Timor, is the Suharto clique, includ-
ing Prabowo's business-woman wife, Titiek Suharto and his 
older brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo. Kopassus also had 
its own businesses, including a shopping mall in Jakarta, but 
the economic meltdown after 1997 may have had a damag-
ing effect on these sources of funding. 
The birth of the new militia 
The relationship between militia groups and Kopassus 
is structural [see 'The army's dirty war in East Timor', TA 
Since Habibie's announce-
ment in January, opinions have been divided as to why 
leading TNI generals accepted the move. The majority, in-
cluding almost all Kopassus officers, could not accept the 
prospect of 'losing' East Timor and they would go to any 
lengths to prevent this from happening. 
Wiranto's involvement 
But what about commander-in-chief General Wiranto? 
What was his role in organising, training and supplying the 
militia? The training of around 11,000 militia in West Timor 
could never have gone ahead without his knowledge and 
consent. General Wiranto, an astute ' political strategist, 
wanted a win-win situation. As defence minister, he sup-
ported the referendum, believing, like Habibie, that the East 
Timor issue had cost Indonesia far too much internationally, 
politically and economically. But as TNI commander-in-
chief, Wiranto supported the military intelligence/K.opassus 
strategy of ensuring a vote for autonomy. The key men in 
charge, Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim and Major-
General Sjafrie Sjamsuddin, were both appointed by him. 
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Operasi Sapu Jagad-11 
After the referendum results were announced on 4 Sep-
tember, the militias and their Kopassus bosses unleashed a 
scorched-earth policy of gigantic proportions. Para-military 
forces joined the fray, along with six TNI battalions, in-
cluding two notorious local battalions, 744 and 745. Alto-
gether about 15,000 men were involved. Without such a 
large contingent of men, it could never have taken hold so 
rapidly. 
Although Sapu Jagad-11 sought to create the impression 
that this was a spontaneous outpouring of anger by pro-
Indonesia forces, there is overwhelming evidence that the 
destruction was a well-prepared military operation. In many 
places, villagers were forced to destroy and burn their own 
neighbourhoods, even their own houses. The aim was to 
destroy as much as possible and punish the pillars of the 
pro-independence movement. The Catholic Church, which 
had given sanctuary to fleeing East Timorese throughout the 
occupation, was one of the main targets. 
General Wiranto may not have been aware of the scale 
of Sapu Jagad II, but within days, things had gone too far 
for him to rein in the monster he had helped to create. He 
was visibly shocked when he visited Dili with five Security 
Council ambassadors on 11 September. This was when he 
decided that he could no long withstand world pressure for 
international intervention. 
The main villains 
For most of 1999, the man in charge was Major-
General Zacky Anwar Makarim, until January 1999 head 
of BIA (renamed BAIS in April 1999), the military intelli-
gence agency, who was the most senior officer on the 
ground in East Timor. After initially operating undercover, 
he was given official status when Wiranto appointed him as 
the TNI liaison officer with UNAMET. Zacky has had a 
long involvement with East Timor and served as an intelli-
gence officer from 1983 to 1989; he is the proto-type of an 
officer who combines a Kopassus background with years of 
intelligence experience. 
The other key officers were Major-General Syafrie 
Syamsuddin, Brig.-General Mahidin Simbolon and Ma-
jor-General Adam Damiri. 
Major-General Syafrie Syamsuddin also combines 
Kopassus combat and intelligence experience. He graduated 
from the military academy in 197 4 and first saw duty in 
East Timor in 1976. He was a member of what became 
known as the 'nanggala ' teams, the Kopassus counter-
insurgency units which became infamous throughout East 
Timor for their unremitting acts of terror and brutality. 
Syafrie attended a special intelligence course in the US in 
1977 and later received anti-terrorist training there in 1986. 
During the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, he was head of 
Kopassus intelligence in East Timor and is widely believed 
to have been the key man behind the massacre. 
Brig-General Mahidin Simbolon, also from the class 
of 1974, has spent at least eight years in East Timor, in-
cluding six tours of duty and between 1975 and 1997, 
eventually becoming military commander (Danrem Wirad-
harme I 64). He took part in the invasion of East Timor in 
December 1975. Mahidin Simbolon took the credit for ar-
resting Xanana Gusmao in 1992 for which. he ~as pro-
moted to colonel. From 1993-1995 he headed mtelhgence at 
Kopassus. After his tour of duty as Dili ~ommander~ he re-
tained his close connection with East Tlnlor by bemg ap-
pointed chief-of-staff of Ko~am IX f!dayana, the military 
command in Bali, a post he sttll occupies. 
These three officers are all very close to Prabowo whose 
connections with East Timor extend much farther and 
deeper than any other Kopassus officer. Sjafrie and Mahidin 
graduated from the military academy in 1974 together with 
Prabowo while Zacky Anwar from the class of '71 is a close 
personal friend of Prabowo' s family. 
Major-General Adam Damiri has also a Kopassus 
background but served most of his military life in Kostrad 
uniform. He is currently commander of Kodam IX Udayana 
and together with chief-of-staff Simbolon, facilitated the 
training of militias in West Timor. The logistics, fmancial 
support and weaponry for the militia mostly went through 
this territorial command. Throughout the two Sapu Jagad 
operations, intelligence, combat and territorial activities 
were closely co-ordinated. 
Now that these operations have ended, Adam Damiri is 
encouraging TNI soldiers of East Timorese origin to shed 
their uniforms and fight a guerrilla war against independent 
East Timor. These openly subversive plans are based in 
West Timor which is under Damiri 's command. 
The second echelon operators 
Two lower-rariking officers involved were: Lt.-Colonel 
Nugroho and Lt.-Colonel Yayak Sudradjat, both Kopas-
sus intelligence officers. Yayak Sudradjat was involved in 
the Liquisa bloodbath in April. They worked closely with 
territorial officers, including Colonel Tono Suratman, the 
military commander of Ko rem 164 Wiradharma of East 
Timor and the thirteen district commanders. Many interna-
tional observers who were in East Timor for the ballot have 
testified to the involvement of TNI territorial units in sup-
porting the militia. 
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Another key operator was Colonel Gerhan Lantara, 
commander of the notorious Airborne Brigade Brigif Linud 
17. This Kostrad brigade was one of the first units para-
chuted into Dili in 1975. He has a long history of service in 
East Timar with Prabowo. During the peaceful demonstra-
tion that preceded the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November 
1991, Lantara infiltrated the crowd. 
East Timor can have its freedom ! 
When he was spotted behaving provocatively, someone 
slashed him with a knife. He was flown out of East Timar 
within hours and 'disappeared' for several years. Mystery 
surrounded his absence from the official inquiry into the 
massacre in 1992. [See TAPOL Bulletin No 108, December 
1991.]In 1996 he re-emerged as commander of Kopassus 
intelligence, after having been protected all those years by 
Prabowo. He later re-appeared in East Timar as the officer 
in charge of sector A (Dili and surroundings). Although 
sectors A, B, and C had been formally disbanded many 
continuation from page 20 
of local financial resources. The TNI hopes to prevent this 
from happening by demanding a 100 per cent increase in the 
military budget. 
Two types of kodams 
In the new structure, there will be two types of kodam, A 
and B. Type A kodams will be those located in more secu-
rity-sensitive places which will get an extra combat brigade 
including infantry and intelligence officers as well as a cav-
alry unit (tanks, armoured personal carriers) and anti-
aircraft missiles. For places of strategic importance like oil 
refineries and so-called 'vital' industries, a special anti-
aircraft unit will be on permanent standby. 
Above the kodams, the country will be divided into 
three army Kowilhans (regional defence commands) a 
structure that was abolished in 1984 in the Murdani over-
haul. A rapid deployment force has been set up known as 
PPRM, to deal with 'mass unrest'. It has already been in 
action in Aceh and was deployed on the streets of Jakarta 
this month when thousands demanded the revocation of the 
state security law, leading to a confrontation that cost seven 
MIL/TAR 
years earlier when the operational command called Koop-
skam was disbanded, the structure remained in place. 
The International Commission of Inquiry should look 
closely at the role of all these officers and build up cases 
against them with the help of personal testimonies from East 
Timorese. 
TNI in a crisis of its own making 
Operasi Sapu Jagad was clearly a disaster for the TNI, 
and in political terms, its worst ever blunder. Although sea-
soned Indonesia watchers have known the capacity of the 
Indonesian army for unrelenting brutality, it was this cam-
paign that finally exposed it to worldwide opprobrium. Now 
at last, governments around the world which have shame-
lessly fostered ties with this killer force are themselves re-
alising that it will have to be called to account for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Domestically, the TNI 
is being widely condemned for its numerous acts of barba-
rism, dating back to the 1965/1966 massacre. 
At the same time, tensions within the TNI are manifold 
and Wiranto's efforts to hold the factions together are 
proving increasing difficult [see article on TNI]. He tried to 
project a good image in May 1998 when he ditched Suharto 
and opted for reformasi. Foreign governments were im-
pressed by what they saw as his leanings towards democ-
racy. But the two weeks of terror in East Timar changed 
everything. He claims that the referendum was lost because 
of vote-rigging by East Timorese local staff working for 
UNAMET and argues that his troops were unable to stop 
the militia violence because of a 'psychological barrier' 
which prevented them from firing at their 'comrade-in-
arms'. Such explanations impress few people in the world 
at large and not many people at home either. But they may 
be able to hold the TNI together, until the next disaster oc-
curs. * 
lives. [See separate article.] The PPRM consists of combat 
troops from the three TNI forces and the police and if recent 
developments are anything to go by, this strike force will use 
all the means at its disposal to prevent civil society from 
taking their demands and grievances onto the streets. * 
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The TNI's expanding territorial structure 
There have been two dramatic events in Indonesia in the past seventeen months, the fall of Suharto 
and the loss of East Timor. In both cases, TNI, the armed forces, played a disastrous role. Never in 
the history of the Republic has the TN/ been so discredited. A closer look at the TN/ and its chang-
ing policies will help reach a better understanding of what is happening. 
In the TNI's own jargon, they are busy 'repositioning, 
redefining and revitalising' themselves. Earlier this year 
they came up with 'four new paradigms' which were de-
scribed as its 'new conceptual framework' (see also TA-
POL Bulletin No. 152, May 1999). They were designed to 
confront the post-Suharto era, an era which for the military 
has been dogged with uncertainties. The economic meltdown 
starting in 1997 and the political crisis ending with the 
ousting of Suharto in May 1998 created a situation of great 
confusion for the average TNI soldier. 
By and large, Indonesian academics are not very im-
pressed with the TNI' s new concept. LIPI, the Indonesian 
Academy of Sciences, has called the reforms 'half-hearted', 
accusing the TNI of being unwilling to go all the way for 
reformasi, the main slogan of the post Suharto era. As LIPI 
sees it, using terms like 'power sharing' and 'role sharing', 
means that the TNI still insists on playing a role in politics. 
Mahrus Irsyam, a senior researcher at the University of In-
donesia, goes further and sees the new paradigms as being 
the same as the New Order, a continuum of the Java-centrist 
outlook that has dominated Indonesia for the last three dec-
ades. 
Critics see the new paradigms as just a rephrasing of the 
Suharto doctrines which were defined in Javanese as: Ing 
ngarso sung tulodo, ing madya mangun karso, tut wuri 
handayani (set an example from the front, work hard in the 
middle, and steer from the behind). These concepts are 
rooted in feudal Javanese tradition and reflect a very milita-
ristic way of thinking. 
Many analysts have come to the conclusion that the TNI 
is in limbo. Suharto's removal created huge problems. Most 
officers as the top were chosen not because of skills and 
experience but because of loyalty towards the old man. Af-
ter two generations, the TNI brass are yes-men, only able to 
think in doctrines and act on orders from above. 
New name, a break with the past? 
In April, Wiranto announced that ABRI would change its 
name back to TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia], which 
was its name in the early years of the Republic. In his Ad-
dress to the MPR on 15 October, President Habibie, speak-
ing also as the armed forces supreme commander, said that 
the change in name was intended ' to draw a clear line be-
tween the ABRI of the past and the TNI of the present and 
future', adding: '(W)e have all seen how ABRI has been the 
target of many criticisms for its role in the past.' But to 
demonstrators on the streets of Jakarta or Acehnese villag-
ers watching terrified as troops 'sweep through' their vil-
lages, there has been no break with the past. 
On the surface other things have changed as well but a 
closer look shows how skin deep these changes are. Polri, 
the Police Force has been separated from the armed forces 
(see TAPOL Bulletin No. 153, July 1999) but it still falls 
under the authority of the Defence Ministry. The TNI com-
mander-in-chief Wiranto is concurrently Defence Minister 
which makes Polri 's independence even more dubious. 
The infamous term sospol, (sosial-politik), a euphemism 
for military meddling in daily life, has been expunged and 
replaced by the term territorial. The powerful position of 
Kassospol, Chief of Staff for social-political affairs, has 
been replaced by Kaster, Chief of Staff for territorial af-
fairs. Most of the discussion within TNI centres around 
redefining and revitalising its sospol and territorial tasks. 
Suharto-isation of the TNI 
In the early eighties, the TNI underwent a major over-
haul; the territorial structure was drastically slimmed down. 
This was the work of the then armed forces commander-in-
chief, General Benny Murdani. The µrree regional upper 
commands (Kowilhan) were dissolved and the seventeen 
regional commands (Kodam) were reduced to ten. The strike 
force component consisting of Kopassus and Kostrad were 
enlarged and modernised. The philosophy behind the reor-
g~sation was simple: security-wise Indonesia is simply too 
big a country to be handled through a territorial structure 
and ~hen unrest erupts anywhere, the centre needs to deploy 
special forces to quell the unrest. For many years, this Gen-
18 TAPOL Bulletin No. 154/155, November 1999 
ghis Khan approach worked; the bottom line was to strike 
the right level of fear among the population. 
Things changed after Suharto fell . Scenes of students in 
the big cities fighting with sticks against the military or the 
police have become quite common. People in Aceh have, 
over and over again, shown their defiance of military bru-
tality and are fighting back. The referendum in East Timor 
boosted the morale of many people in regions demanding 
more autonomy. 
The reorganisation of the eighties was meant to pro~es­
sionalise the armed forces. But by the end of the eighties, 
the work of General Benny Murdani had been overtaken by 
events. The Suharto family started to emerge as the domi-
nant force in the economy as well as in politics. The TNI 
was transformed into a 'palace army' . Top generals were no 
longer selected on quality and professionalism but on l?yal~ 
towards the Suharto family. The present TNI leadership still 
reflects that kind of cronyism. The three top generals: Wi-
ranto (armed forces c-in-c), Sugiono (armed forces chief of 
the general staff) and Subagyo (army chief of staff) were all 
former commanders of Suharto's Palace Guard or presiden-
tial aides. 
General Benny Murdani, loyal to Suharto for many 
years, was unceremoniously ditched in 1988 when he criti-
cised the business activities of Tutut Suharto, the eldest 
daughter. 
Privatising the TNI 
Things grew worse when it was decided in 1988 that 
strategic companies needed special protection. TNI units 
developed special relations with 'strategic' companies like 
the high-tech military industrial complex and private com-
panies like Freeport/Rio Tinto in West Papua. TNI soldiers 
became security guards for these companies, on their pay-
roll. 
Until the early eighties the several military components, 
the territorial commands, Kostrad, and Kopassus had their 
own string of private companies to raise money. But globali-
sation brought many of these companies to their knees be-
cause of mismanagement, corruption and inability to com-
pete in the free market. Many generals became increasingly 
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reliant on one or more companies or conglomerates. While 
low-ranking officers supplemented their meagre wages by 
moonlighting as security guards or store detectives, top gen-
erals became the errand boys of big business. 
There is a stark difference between the seventies and 
nineties. In the earlier years of the Orde Baru, the sky was 
the limit for TNI officers. Super-rich generals were part of 
the Jakarta jet set. But in the nineties, most of the super-rich 
were Suharto cronies, while military business ventures were 
in decline. The TNI had to supplement their earnings from 
schemes mentioned above as well as getting involved in or-
ganised crime. Illegal gambling dens; prostitution, drugs, 
protection-rackets in shopping malls became money-
spinners for the TNI. Many TNI members earn more from 
their 'casual' jobs than from being soldiers. Against the 
background of such widespread breakdown of discipline, it 
has become increasingly difficult for HQ to assert its 
authority. 
The faltering line of command 
The recent events in East Timar have earned the TNI wide-
spread condemnation. The two weeks in September when 
the Kopassus/militia went on the rampage in East Timar 
have proved conclusively that TNI HQ at Cilangkap is no 
longer able to control the troops. Some experienced foreign 
correspondents in Jakarta described these acts as open re-
bellion against Cilangkap (see also 'The Kopassus/militia 
alliance' in this issue) . General Wiranto proved incapable of 
containing Kopassus but nor was he willing or able have a 
showdown with the elite force .. 
During the hectic days of May 1998 prior to the fall of 
Suharto, the signs were that the combat troops including 
Kopassus, the strike force within Kostrad and the strike 
force of the Jakarta military command sided with Prabowo 
against Wiranto. Prabowo strongly opposed the dismissal of 
his father-in-law and planned to assert his will on Suharto's 
successor by forcing his way into Habibie's residence. On 
the streets, troops loyal to Wiranto, including Brimob, the 
crack police unit, and the marines, 'rescued' demonstrating 
students who otherwise would have been butchered by 
Prabowo's forces. Prabowo was prevented from entering the 
palace by a senior officer, General Sintong Panjaitan, a 
military advisor to Habibie. He was overpowered and was 
later removed from his position, along with other senior 
Kopassus officers. It is far from clear whether this is the 
entire story; Prabowo fled overseas and the TNI closed 
ranks by sealing their lips. 
Wiranto versus Kopassus 
The failure of Prabowo's feeble coup attempt forced Wi-
ranto's conflict with Kopassus out into the open. Wiranto 
came to rely on the combat forces of the navy, air force and 
police, the marines, Paskhasau, the airforce paratroopers, 
and Brimob and chose marines to guard his private resi-
dence. 
In a reshuffle earlier this year, Wiranto removed a few 
key Kopassus officers including Major-General Zacky An-
war Makarim who was head of military intelligence but this 
was a half-hearted reshuffle. Kopassus was simply too big 
and too strong to be confronted head on and he failed to re-
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move Prabowo' s close associate, the four-star General 
Subagyo who was army chief-of-staff. For months, rumours 
have been circulating that Subagyo would be sacked but 
nothing has happened. The events in East Timor show that 
Wiranto backed what Kopassus was doing there but he and 
other Cilangkap generals were not able to keep control of 
the operation. [See article on East Timar]. 
When martial law was declared in East Timor on 6 Sep-
tember in an attempt to rein in the militia, Cilangkap dis-
patched Major-General Kiki Syahnakri to Dili to take con-
trol. An old East Timor hand and Kopassus officer, Kiki 
became a staunch Wiranto loyalist. In 1995, when he was 
military commander in East Timar, he had a serious clash 
with Prabowo and was removed. As martial law executor, 
he was given three extra battalions but was ·hardly able to 
protect the besieged UN compound or the airport. Later he 
had the unrewarding job of co-operating with Interfet and 
finally handing over to them. 
No confrontation 
Wiranto' s strategy has been to avoid confrontation with 
Kopassus, knowing that this would be disastrous for the 
armed forces. He may well calculate that he would come out 
the loser in such a clash. But this is not only a power strug-
gle, it is also a conflict between two lines, one of which is 
rather reform-minded while the other, the hard-liners reject 
any change. 
The reform-minded officers in Cilangkap, who are in the 
minority, want to curb the far-reaching autonomy which 
Kopassus still enjoys by lumping together the strike forces 
of the four forces into one rapid-deployment force. In addi-
tion they are proceeding to reverse the overhaul of the army 
by Murdani in the 1980s and to strengthen the territorial 
structure of the army. 
The Cilangkap reformers have now acknowledged that 
they must take a few steps back with regard to some key 
elements of the army' s 'dual function', relinquishing their 
political role in society and allowing civilians to take greater 
control. One area is their hold on seats in Parliament. Prior 
to the June elections, there was a heated discussion in the 
old parliament about the number of TNI seats in the new 
parliament. Army representatives did not press the case for 
retention but the other parties reached a compromise, giving 
3 8 seats to TNI, half of what they had previously. Some 
sources say the TNI top would not have minded losing all 
their seats but the civilian politicians, still thinking like Su-
harto-era pawns, opted to continue the army' s role in poli-
tics. 
The reform group, with the blessing of Wiranto, has also 
slashed the TNI karyawan doctrine much to the annoyance 
of the hard-liners. This is the doctrine that gives officers the 
assurance of decent jobs after retirement, as village heads, 
district heads, governors or ministerial posts. More than 
3,000 active military were forced to choose between keeping 
their jobs in the bureaucracy or returning to the TNI. 
But while taking these steps back, the Cilangkap reform-
ers have made gains elsewhere, by strengthening the territo-
rial structure, the structure through which the military 
maintain control over the population at large. This is a de-
velopment that has major repercussions for democracy. 
Territorial enlargement 
There is one issue on which everyone in the TNI agrees, 
that Indonesia should not fall apart. The 'loss' of East Timor 
has raised the spectre of other regions wanting to break 
away. The TNI reform group has devised a plan to 
strengthen the territorial structure, as the way to prevent 
'balkanisation' . Preserving the unitary state is seen as sa-
cred by everybody in the TNI, the top priority. In this con-
text, 'separatism' will become the main enemy. 
The point was stressed recently by Lt-General Agus 
Widjojo, one of the TNl's leading thinkers and director of 
the armed forces think-tank, Sesko-TNI, and in May, they 
held a seminar on how to deal with this danger. The re-
structuring introduced fifteen years ago by Benny Murdani 
is now being completely reversed. 
The ten military commands (kodam) will be increased to 
seventeen. Each of the 'trouble spots" like Maluku Aceh 
East Kalimantan and Irian Jaya will have their own Kodam~ 
The first new military command, Kodam Pattimura has al-
ready been inaugurated while Sumatra and Sulawesi will be 
divided into 4 and 3 kodams respectively. 
It so happens that these trouble spots are all located in 
geo-politically sensitive areas. Aceh is lies at the northern 
tip of the strategic Malacca Straits, and Maluku is situated 
between the Pacific and the Asian continents so the TNI can 
argue that territorial enlargement is needed for military de-
fence purposes. All the kodams with their subordinate com-
mands down to village level shadow the civilian administra-
tive structure and it is this shadow structure that represents 
the re~l power structure. The pro-democracy movement has 
done little as yet to call for this territorial structure to be 
disbanded. Opposition to the creation of new kodams has so 
far come o.nly fr~m people in Aceh and West Papua for 
whom the nght to mdependence has become the key issue. 
Another reason for enlarging the territorial structure is to 
provide new jobs for lower-ranking officers who have lost 
jobs in the kekaryaan structure. In the fifties, territorial 
commanders grew very powerful and waged rebellions 
against the centre, prompted by arguments over the control 
continued on page J 7 
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Xanana and Horta on Timor's future 
Xanana Gusmao, president of the East Timorese Resistance Council, the CNRT, visited London in 
October. He met the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Minister for International De-
velopment, and spoke to NGOs who have supported his people's struggle/or years. He also spoke at 
Chatham House, a foreign affairs think-tank. The following combines Xanana 's comments with a 
speech by Jose Ramos Horta at the Catholic Institute of International Relations two weeks later. 
Speaking to a roomful of enthusiastic East Timor activ-
ists, the East Timorese leader, spoke warmly of the signifi-
cance of the solidarity movement to his country's long 
struggle. There would be extremely difficult times ahead 
because East Timor had been left in such a state of total 
devastation, having to start rebuilding the country from 
'below zero' . The meeting was chaired by 
Carmel Budiardjo of T APOL 
Reconciliation 
On reconciliation with the pro-autonomy 
forces in East Timor, Xanana explained that 
the CNRT had devoted much time and effort 
to bringing about reconciliation but the de-
liberate destruction that had occurred during 
September had compelled them to re-think 
their policy. There could be reconciliation 
only with people who had campaigned for 
autonomy without resorting to violence and 
were prepared to a~cept the ballot result. 
In interviews given after his return to 
Dili on 22 October, Xanana elaborated on 
this point, saying that amnesty would be 
granted to those former militiamen who 
confessed to their crimes, provided that lo-
cal people were willing to forgive them. 
Granting a blanket amnesty would be an 
empty political gesture. Speaking at the 
CIIR event, Ramos-Horta said that r:iany 
militiamen had been under the influence of 
Sanctions against Indonesia 
What role had economic sanctions against Indonesia 
played, Xanana was asked, and what about the impact on 
the people of Indonesia? He said that during his seven years 
in prison with Indonesian activists, they had said how im-
drugs when they committed atrocities. One Xan~na Gus"!'ao am~ng_ old friends: Lord A~eb~ry (TAPOL 
group who had killed a group of nuns and President), Liem Soei Liong and Carmel Budiardjo 
church activists has since confessed to the crime, saying portant it was to put pressure on the world's financial insti-
they were drugged at the time. tutions to threaten sanctions. Indonesia's poor did not bene-
Asked about East Timor' s future relations with countries fit from foreign aid, so much of which has been corrupted or 
like Australia which had recognised integration in order to used to help fund the militia terror in East Timor. He did not 
reach agreement with Indonesia to exploit East Timor' s oil, believe that economic sanctions would harm the poor people 
Horta said that if his country judged its future foreign rela- of Indonesia. The threat of economic sanctions when East 
tions on the basis of how countries had behaved towards Timor was being destroyed had had an almost instantaneous 
East Timor in the past, they would have hardly any friends. effect. 
He stressed that the resistance leadership had never been Horta said that the question of sanctions was a matter for 
disparaging about the Australian people or the Indonesian the people of East Timor, even ifNGOs in Indonesia did not 
people and treasured their support. It was public opinion that support the idea. And if sanctions hit the Indonesian mili-
had forced the world community to press Indonesia to accept tary, this would help students in Indonesia who suffered so 
an international peace-keeping force. much at the hands of the military. 
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Asked why the CNRT had accepted the 5 May accord for 
the holding of a ballot with very unfavourable security con-
ditions, Xanana said that the East Timorese had been crying 
and dying for 23 years. They knew that they would be called 
on to make yet more sacrifices for freedom. 
CNRT's demands to British Government 
Jose Ramos-Horta said that in their meetings with Brit-
ish ministers, he and Xanana had raised a number of issues : 
The East Timorese forced to flee to West Timor were 
now hostages in the hands of the militia; they must return 
home without delay. The CNRT rejects the argument that 
they have no homes to go to or that security is not assured .. 
The UN and governments around the world must press In-
donesia hard on this and help provide transportation. 
Aid agencies and UN bodies now flooding into Dili must 
discipline themselves and properly co-ordinate their activi-
ties. There was a scramble for space in the city with the 
danger that the CNRT would be crowded out. 
During the transitional period when East Timor will be 
run by UNTAET (UN Transitional Authority for East 
Timor), the UN should allow the CNRT to play a role in the 
administration in all departments except the judiciary. 
The international community should press ahead with 
moves to set up a war crimes tribunal to try all those respon-
sible for grievous human rights violations in East Timor. 
Finally, they had urged the British Government to con-
tinue with the embargo on arms sales to Indonesia. This was 
necessary for strategic and moral reasons. 
Building Timor Loro Sa'e from scratch 
The East Timorese resistance leader told his many audi-
ences that the new state about to be born would be called the 
Republic ofTimor Loro Sa'e. 
His speech at Chatham House was devoted to the task of 
building his country's future. The CNRT had drafted plans 
in April for reconstruction but these had now been scrapped 
because of the devastation wrought. Help would be needed 
from the international community; the World Bank had of-
fered to help but the CNRT would avoid falling into the trap 
of indebtedness. 
Year One of the three-year transition would be devoted 
to coping with the emergency. Not till 2001 would it be pos-
sible to think about development when the emphasis would 
be on creating food stability. The next stage would be to 
foster the creation of small industries. There were no plans 
to build mega projects. 
On the Timor Gap Treaty signed in 1989 between Indo-
nesia and Australia to exploit East Timor's oil, Horta said 
they had opposed the treaty at the time but he had encour-
aged Norway' s state oil company to go ahead with explora-
tion activities which would take years to bear fruit. The idea 
had now paid off as East Timor would be the beneficiary. 
East Timor would not re-negotiate the treaty. Talks would 
soon be held with Australia but during the transition admini-
stration, East Timor would not be entitled to sign interna-
tional treaties. 
Would Indonesia be likely to use West Timor as a base 
from which to destabilise East Timor? Horta felt that the 
army's crack unit, Kopassus, which had played the_ leading 
role in the militia campaign would not do this as it would 
drag their reputation even farther into the mud. 
Language, currency and foreign relations 
East Timor will adopt Portuguese as the official lan-
guage and Tetum will be developed as the national lan-
guage. There wiU no restrictions on people using Indonesian, 
said Horta. 
The currency of the new state will be the escudos which 
will be tied to the euro. 
The CNRT has set up a Gender Equity Commission to 
rectify the present male bias. The organisation' s highest 
body with 21 members includes only one woman, which was 
simply not good enough. 
On foreign relations, East Timor will join the South Pa-
cific Forum, not ASEAN, but will establish good bilateral 
relations with the ASEAN members. The CNRT recognises 
the importance of Australia as a regional power and wants it 
to continue to lead the peace-keeping force when this is 
taken over by the UN. 
Efforts will be made to establish cordial relations with 
Indonesia. Following the election of Abdurrachman Wahid 
as President, Xanana said he hoped to visit Indonesia shortly 
to meet the new president. In a major policy address, Presi-
dent Wahid said he hoped to Dili or Darwin to meet 
Xanana. 
Both Xanana and Horta were deeply moved and proud of 
the resilience and courage of their long-suffering people and 
spoke confidently of East Timor being the first new state of 
the 21st millennium. • 
Rights activists deported from Jayapura 
Two human rights activists, Abigail Abrash of the 
Washington-based Robert Kennedy Memorial Fund, and 
Christopher Ballard from the UK, were deported from 
Jayapura on the orders of the Irian Jaya chief of police. 
They were on their way to Timika to undertake investiga-
tions into the impact of Freeport/Rio Tinto mining opera-
tions on the lives of local people and human rights abuses 
which may have involved the company. 
The deportation order was served soon after their arri-
val on 16 September, on the grounds that the two had vio-
lated the terms of their visas although this was untrue. 
The investigations were launched after share-holders 
registered complaints about human rights abuses in Timika. 
After negotiations, the company agreed to co-operate. Sup-
porting documents had been obtained in Jakarta for the two 
to go to Timika via Jayapura, and the mission had the 
backing of the National Human Rights Commission. But 
the security authorities in Irian Jaya thought otherwise. 
After returning to Jakarta, the deportation order was re-
scinded but the mission has now been postponed and will 
probably take place early next year. * 
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East Timorese trapped in West Timor 
When the TN I-backed militia wreaked havoc in East Timor following the ballot, they forcibly 
evacuated around a quarter of a million East Timorese to West Timor. These involuntary refugees 
have been congregated in concentration camps as virtual hostages in a plot to destabilise East 
Timor. With militia bandits controlling the camps, it has been difficult for humanitaria_n agencies to 
provide relief and make arrangements for their immediate repatriation. 
Until the recent events, West Timor 
which became part of the Indonesian Re-
public after the transfer of sovereignty 
from the Dutch in 1949, has figured 
hardly at all in East Timor' s plight al-
though it surrounds the enclave, Oecussi, 
located on the north coast of the island, 
which became part of Portuguese Timor in 
an accord between the Dutch and Portu-
guese at the turn of the century. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1264 
adopted on 15 September, providing for a 
multinational force to take control of secu-
rity in East Timor, did not extend the UN 
mandate to West Timor although Para-
graph 7 states that 'it is the responsibility 
of the Indonesian authorities to take im-
mediate and effective measures to ensure 
the safe return of refugees to East Timor' . 
This was clearly applicable to the refugees 
in West Timor but progress has been un-
acceptably slow while the militia have 
imposed a reign of terror in the camps. Appalling conditions in the refugee camps in West Timor 
A premeditated plan for mass 
expulsion 
The speed with which more than a quarter of the East 
Timorese population were driven over the border shows that 
this was a carefully-planned operation to destabilise East 
Timor and provide a base from which the Kopassus/militia 
alliance could launch acts of subversion. A letter dated 3 
July written by a senior assistant to General Feisal Tanjung, 
Indonesia's Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security 
Affairs, outlined contingency plans in the event of the 
autonomy option being rejected. It referred to the need to 
make preparations in West Timor 'for the influx of a very 
large number of refugees (from East Timor) and arrange-
ments to keep them under control.' 
New militia training ground 
The presence of thousands of militiamen in West Timor 
has also brought instability to the Indonesian province; they 
have thrown their weight around, behaved arrogantly to-
wards local traders and spread their unruly behaviour to 
such an extent that local church leaders have complained .. 
Thousands of militiamen withdrew to West Timor for 
two reasons, to re-muster forces and recruit new members, 
conduct military training and make incursions into East 
Timor, and to maintain a grip on the hundreds of thousands 
of people from East Timor, hoping to use them as hostages. 
Recruitment plans were boosted when hundreds of troops 
from the largely East Timorese Battalions 744 and 745 an-
nounced their eagerness to join the militias. Major-General 
Adam Damiri, commander of the Udayana military com-
mand which covers West Timor, along with a major general 
from the armed forces who is assistant for operations, en-
couraged them to go ahead 'as long as they shed their army 
uniforms' . This is tantamount to open incitement of subver-
sion against East Timor. 
Appalling conditions 
The refugees are concentrated mainly in Atambua in the 
north just a few miles from Balibo in East Timor, and 
around the provincial capital, Kupang. Foreign journalists 
and aid agency officials have been prevented from ap-
continued on page 4 
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Observing the fear and terror 
The International Federation for East Timor (IFET) organised the largest international observer 
mission to the consultation. Its Observer Project brought volunteers from 22 countries to observe 
the process from be/ ore voter registration to the announcement of the result and beyond. On 
August 30, 125 observers observed balloting at 135 of the 200 polling centres. Here, four observers 
from Britain give graphic accounts of what happened and reflect on their experiences. 
Baucau 
High in the foothills of Mount Matebian, we rose early 
as the dawn mist shimmered below the settlement of Queli-
cai where we were to observe the ballot. By 5:30, as we 
drove to our first polling centre, hundreds of people were 
converging on the tiny village school to play their part in 
this defining moment in their country's history. Many had 
walked for several hours through the night to be there. To 
witness their determination and courage was a humbling 
expenence. 
Our team of two IFET-OP observers and five local ob-
servers visited five polling centres in the Quelicai district 
that morning. We were struck by the patience of people 
queuing for hours in the hot sun. Fortunately, the impressive 
efficiency of UNAMET electoral officers and local staff 
meant that most votes had been cast by lunchtime. No ma-
jor incidents of intimidation or violence were reported, a 
pattern that was repeated throughout most of the country (in 
itself an indication that the militia were tightly controlled by 
TNI and under instructions not to start their offensive until 
after the ballot). 
We stayed in the area until 4 o'clock, to witness the clo-
sure of the ballot boxes at a centre where 2,010 people out 
of a registration list of 2,015 (a staggering 99.75 per cent.) 
had voted. A similar massive turnout was confirmed across 
the whole of East Timar. 
Driving home to Baucau through the spectacular moun-
tain scenery, tired and relieved the day had passed without 
incident, it was not easy to imagine things could go so horri-
bly wrong. But we knew that the days and weeks ahead 
would be extremely dangerous. 
Baucau, East Timor's second city, some 80 miles east of 
Dili on the north coast, and the surrounding electoral region, 
had remained calm throughout the consultation process de-
spite the presence of Team Saka militia and other smaller 
militia groups. CNRT was able to open offices and to cam-
paign relatively freely. When the campaigning period 
closed on 27 August, a massive procession of CNRT trucks 
and minibuses with up to 5,000 people paraded around Bau-
cau and nearby villages. 
But there were plenty of warnings about the conse-
quences of a vote in favour of independence. The underly-
ing level of real fear was ominously apparent. A sense of 
unreality was summed up by the prominent slogan on the 
wal of the headquarters of the feared Brimob special forces: 
'Fight crime, love humanity'. 
The close relationship between TNI and the militias was 
never in any doubt. TNI/Kopassus personnel were among 
the militia leaders. In Quelicai, Team Saka operated out of 
a TNI barracks. New groups ('Partisan' and 'Rajawali') 
were being armed and trained by the local military com-
mand. Reports indicated that large quantities of guns were 
being shipped into the area and stored by the militia. A 
formal handing over of weapons was thought to be no more 
than a public relations exercise. 
We were informed by local contacts of TNI/militia plans 
to 'shoot everything' in Baucau and flatten the infrastructure 
if autonomy was rejected. Warnings of a civil war and 
bloodshed were commonplace. At one meeting, militia 
leaders stated that a vote against autonomy would result in 
all militia family members being relocated to Kupang or 
Sulawesi. Those not prepared to leave would be shot. 
Bishop Basilio do Nascimento told us of his concern about 
the first few months after the ballot and said it was essential 
for foreigners to remain in the country. 
But the most compelling indicator of the likely terror of 
the post-ballot period was the abject fear of ordinary 
Timorese who knew better than anyone what the TNI and 
their militia proxies were capable of, the kind of deep-rooted 
fear born of over 20 years suffering, which is apparent in 
eyes that have lost their natural ability to smile. 
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Our temporary lodging in Quelicai was the home of two 
UNAMET local staff, and therefore a target. Before the 
ballot Team Saka members visited houses and warned that 
' people would be killed and houses burned if independence 
won. Many young men left home at night to sleep in the 
bush. 
A massive evacuation to the mountains - where F alintil 
could offer some protection - was planned after the ballot. 
Terrified villagers were urged UNAMET staff to stay as a 
deterrent. Time and time again, UNAMET assured them 
they would stay whatever the outcome of the vote. Sadly, it 
did not take them long to go back on their word. 
Interfet has now established a presence in Baucau but 
the fate of our friends and colleagues in the city and the 
outlying villages and mountains is still unknown. 
Paul Barber 
Mana tu to 
Recent events in East Timor were predicted by many 
sources. Various reports have documented evidence that the 
intimidation, enforced evacuation and murder of thousands 
of East Timorese were carried out by the TNI, Kopassus and 
the militias working together. 
The evidence gathered in Manatuto prior to, during and 
immediately after the popular consultation helps to confirm 
this and demonstrates that Manatuto was not a unique town. 
It was just another example of a widespread and premedi-
tated policy of co-operation between TNI and the pro-
autonomy forces. 
Manatuto, East Timor's third largest town, on the north-
ern coastal road almost half way between Dili and Baucau, 
is the capital of a large district that stretches from the north 
to the south coast, a strongly pro-independence town with a 
large F alantil base nearby. According to one resident, 3, 000 
of the 9,000 population are now hiding in the hills; the rest 
he presumed were forced to West Timor or are missing. 
Unlike in many other towns in East Timor, the pro-
independence side were able to campaign freely, distribute 
campaign literature and hold large meetings. CNRT pro-
vided their own security while the militia officially catered 
for the pro-autonomy group. However, this fa9ade of a 
democratic campaign was always fraught with tension and 
did on occasions exploded into violence. 
One incident, on 19 August, clearly demonstrated a link 
between the official and unofficial pro-Indonesia forces. For 
no obvious reason gunfire started at around 8 am. Around 
30 neighbours ran into our house for cover. About half an 
hour later I witnessed a police truck full of uniformed and 
armed police firing their weapons into the air to intimidate 
the local population. Shooting directly in front of our house, 
they ensured that we remained inside. 
Although we were not witnesses to other events that 
morning we saw armed militiamen walking around unim-
peded by the police. While the police were firing around 
town, the CNRT building had its windows smashed. Local 
eyewitnesses reported that four militia and one Kopassus 
soldier hurled rocks into the building and tried to place a red 
and white piece of material inside. 
In the days that followed the police apologised to 
UNAMET for their behaviour claiming that they had been 
EASTTIMOR 
The same morning a UNAMET Military Liaison Officer 
(MLO) had been threatened with a 9mm brand new gun. A 
militia member was arrested and his weapon seized, but he 
was later released without charge. The police admitted they 
could not charge anyone as the local .military commander 
was responsible for the militia and the police were therefore 
powerless to prosecute. 
After the vote a police source and the Indonesian MLO 
alleged that UNAMET staff had told people how to vote and 
that the ballot papers were pre-marked. These and other al-
legations were presented to UNAMET to prove the ballot 
had been unfair and the result would be biased. Observers 
in Same heard exactly the same allegations. We saw no evi-
dence to support the allegations. Plans to discredit the ballot 
had been conceived well in advance. 
The IFET team were forced to evacuate Manatuto on l 
September. A militia leader had told me earlier that 
'everything will be fine until the 31st.' One of our contacts 
who attended a meeting with the military and the police re-
ported that the military had warned the militia would go on 
the offensive from 1 September, targeting specific people. 
Militia resources would come straight from the army and the 
militia would be armed with 1,000 army guns with which to 
carry out their campaign of terror. 
We were able to leave, unharmed and safely. The trag-
edy is that the East Timorese were not. 
Charmain Mohamed 
Maubisse 
Maubisse, on the edge of Ainaro and Aileu districts, is a 
beautiful small town high in the mountains of central East 
Timor. On top of a small hill sits a grand old Portuguese· 
fort, originally a home in the hills for the Portuguese gover-
nor of East Timor. When our IFET-OP observer team ar-
rived, two-and-a-half weeks before the referendum, the 
house and outbuildings were a temporary home for 
UNAMET - with accompanying Civilian Police (CivPol) 
and a squad of BRIMOB drafted into East Timor to help 
create and maintain 'a climate free of fear and intimidation'. 
The local militia - Mahidi ('life or death for integra-
tion') - had instructed people to put red-and-white flags up 
or there would be trouble. When UNAMET asked about 
raising the UN flag, the police told them they could not 
guarantee their safety. They had no control over Mahidi. 
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The town seemed peaceful on the surf ace - shops were 
busy, the market was a hive of activity, children tirelessly 
shouted 'Hallo Mee-ster' whenever a foreigner passed, peo-
ple seemed to be going about their nonnal business. How-
ever, there was an almost tangible air of tension. 
Outside the church a group of pro-independence activists 
gathered regularly. In fact, they slept in the church. This was 
the only place they felt safe because Mahidi had threatened 
them all with death. In May, between two and five people 
had been killed by the militia in every village in the sur-
rounding area including five in Maubisse. At night, groups 
of militia patrolled the town carrying modem, semi-
automatic weapons. 
Ordinary people lived in a climate of fear. Everyone 
stayed indoors at night. We received repeated reports of 
militia threatening to bum down houses of independence 
activists, or threaten to bum whole villages if the ballot fa-
voured for independence. 'A return to 1975' was almost the 
campaign slogan of the pro-autonomy political fronts - who 
were represented by the same people running the militia. 
It was a miracle that no major incidents of violence oc-
curred during the campaign period and on the day of the 
ballot. Perhaps it was because the Mahidi were in such tight 
control of the area and because such a prevalent climate of 
fear existed they felt no need to assert themselves. It was in 
part also due to the mediation skills of the local CivPols -
frustrated about their lack of real authority (and firearms) 
they were good at defusing potential incidents. An uneasy 
stability existed in the run up to the ballot. 
The atmosphere nose-dived from the day of the ballot. A 
commotion caused by the local sub-district head brought 
voting to a halt for an hour-and-a-half, and later all the local 
Timorese staff employed by UNAMET received death 
threats from senior militia members. They were too scared 
to go home after voting and slept in the voting centre. 
UNAMET/CivPols managed to negotiate a BRIMOB guard 
overnight, then persuaded the local militia leaders the next 
day to give their word, in front of UNAMET, that the local 
staff would come to no harm. 
Meantime, the militia were gathering in strategic posi-
tions around the town, openly carrying clubs and machetes. 
Three roadblocks were put in place. Since many local people 
had voted and fled to the hills, or to Dili, Maubisse began to 
look like a ghost town: shops were shut, few people were in 
the streets, and the market was deserted. 
It was plain there was nothing more we could do. We 
were not an army. Our team took the agonising decision to 
leave for IFET HQ in Dili, not knowing if we would see 
many of the people we had met alive again. 
Stephen Malloch 
Maliana 
Since the announcement of the popular consultation, 
Maliana has been one of the most volatile areas as a militia 
stronghold and strategic centre for the pro-integrationist 
groups. The pro-autonomy/militia groups in Bobonaro - led 
by local warlord, mafioso figure and two-term district head 
Joao Tavares (who was present when five western journal-
ists were killed in 1975) - began their campaign of intimi-
dation in February 1999. 
In Bobonaro, two militia groups operated under the di-
rection of district commander, along with twelve Kopassus 
officers attached to their SGI centre. Besi Merah Putih (with 
the local Mahana branch of Dadarus) included both coerced 
villagers and paid thugs who were initially ordered to carry 
out small-scale intimidation with home-made rifles and ma-
chetes. Halilintar (a salaried and long-standing paramilitary 
group with automatic weapons) carried out more extensive 
operations against pro-independence targets, such as killings 
and ninja kidnappings. 
Many claimed that Halilintar was the de facto army of 
Joao Tavares. As the appointed chief of Bobonaro district 
(read: Godfather), Tavares always enjoyed substantial fi-
nancial backing from Jakarta and local business deals. 
When TNI set up the militia structures, Tavares was chosen 
and paid to lead the PPI (militia umbrella organisation) as 
commander of the militia forces. Now based in Atambua, he 
remains the Supreme Commander of the newly-regrouped 
militia forces in West Timor. 
In April 1999, six government officers and teachers sus-
pected of being CNRT supporters were executed in public 
by special forces agents and the newly-formed BMP under 
the orders of the local military commander who was present. 
The bodies were left on the street for the afternoon as a 
warning. Documents have confirmed that funds used to pay 
military personnel, government leaders and militia were di-
verted from a development budget for schools and public 
works projects. 
Around this time, local government employees (including 
teachers), were threatened with death by the local army and 
administration chiefs if they did not support the pro-
autonomy campaign. An unknown number of civilians with 
s':1spected independence affiliations were captured and 
killed. Others were arrested, beaten and their houses burned. 
In the following months, the terrorisation of the population 
of Bobonaro escalated. Community leaders thought to be 
pro-independence activists were threatened with death and 
often re~eiv~d night-visits. In Bobonaro, people suspected of 
supportmg mdependence were forced to eat their own ears 
cut off by militia members. With the arrival of UNAMET in 
June, the intimidation continued less overtly with the em-
phasis on night-time 'ninja' visits. 
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houses burned or families killed if they did not participate in 
the pro-autonomy rallies. Often they were transported to the 
rallies by truck. At one rally, an official told the crowd, 'If 
you don't vote for autonomy, there will be a war like 1975, 
and you will not be able to tend to your rice fields. ' The 
night before, Kopassus soldiers in civilian clothes and local 
militia members went to every house in the surrounding vil-
lages to tell people to attend the rally or they would be vis-
ited at night by the militia. 
Many militia members and political leaders had been 
forced to support autonomy to protect themselves and their 
families . In a secret conversation, one militia commander 
revealed how he had ordered his members to carry out op-
erations because he and his family were threatened with 
death by military intelligence agents. Villagers said this mi-
litia commander had used his position to warn villagers 
about imminent attacks so they could escape to the hills. 
By the referendum date, thousands of people were dis-
placed throughout the district having escaped attacks or the 
very real threats of attack. In late June, the militia attacked 
the UNAMET compound. In August, they attacked the Ba-
tugade registration centre after UNAMET refused to register 
West Timorese 'refugees' with fraudulent documents. The 
attack was ordered by a local pro-autonomy leader, resulted 
in a local UN staff member being badly beaten at the polling 
station. 
Just prior to the ballot, the Bobonaro commander, who 
was widely known to be controlling the militia groups, was 
replaced in a deal struck by military leaders and UNAMET. 
However, he continued to orchestrate events in Mahana 
through his subordinates, often returning to the area from 
nearby Atambua in West Timor. 
Ballot Day 
The people of Bobonaro stole the day braving the intimi-
dation to seize this long-awaited opportunity. There was a 
huge voter tum-out of around 95%. According to a local 
Priest at the final mass before the referendum, the choice 
was simple: between the forces of Satan and God. Some 
voters seem bewildered, some overcome with emotion and 
some just kissed the ballot box as they sent their 'voices' to 
be taken up into the heavens by UN helicopters. 
In Tapo village, TNI members rumoured an imminent 
attack by BMP on the children of votir.g parents. The polling 
station practically cleared as villagers fled. Understandably, 
all the bravery and courage of the voters evaporated. Men 
from the village armed themselves with machetes and pre-
pared for an attack. As the village emergency bell rang con-
tinuously, conversations overheard by a IFET-OP observer 
revealed that the armed police were too scared to intervene. 
UN Military Officers and Indonesian officers diffused the 
situation and the final UN figures revealed that around 97% 
of registered voters had voted in Tapo. 
The aftermath 
The threat of an all-out attack on the night of ballot 
forced the population to flee after voting. Most families ran 
. to the mountain area of Loileo above the town. Many had 
already buried their belongings fearing that their houses 
would be burned, which is what happened. Autonomy sup-
porters, fled to Atambua in trucks overflowing with belong-
ings; their families had been moved to Atambua before the 
referendum, for fear of. fear retribution by Falintil. 
EASTTIMOR 
Many autonomy supporters were local government offi-
cials coerced into joining and were playing a double-game to 
protect themselves, their families and their local communi-
ties. By obtaining information from the autonomy leaders 
and the military co-ordinators they used clandestine net-
works to inform local people of planned attacks. 
With Maliana emptied of its population after the referen-
dum, an autonomy insider reported that a hard-core of 
around 30 BMP militia {probably including local TNI and 
police) were operating in the town. Their base was the PPI 
office where they were in radio contact with SGI, the territo-
rial army and the police. In the campaign period, SGI had 
co-ordinated militia operations out of this office .. 
According to reliable sources, the local army commander 
(who was supposed to have been replaced) and the local 
'mayor' met two days after the ballot and made plans to 
' finish ' Mahana. The SGI military intelligence co-ordinator 
was sent to Atambua to obtain a large sum of money from 
the Accounts Department at the Atambua District Govern-
ment to distribute to the remaining military militia com-
manders. 
With the departure of the district commander, his deputy 
to~k control and directed the militia in Mahana. Ampheta-
mme tablets were secretly added to alcohol given to militia 
before operations. People who believed they had been given 
the drug said the effect lasted for up to 36 hours when mili-
tia members might kill or attack and even bum their own 
houses without any recollection. 
On 2 September, the operation to rid Bobonaro of inter-
national observers and destroy Mahana began. At around 
12pm militiamen visited the CNRT information centre 
promising a peaceful reconciliation. At 4pm, the same mili-
tia launched an attack on the centre with TNI support. The 
centre housed many students and independence supporters 
who had been living together for weeks in large numbers 
because of threats against them. 
According to a hand-written witness report, a band of 
machete-wielding militia attacked the front of the office with 
two local army members (KODIM) shouting "kill everyone 
and bum down the building". The two army members in full 
view of the police attacked the building from the back with 
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automatic guns. One witness described how the centre began 
to burn and the continuous shooting of automatic weapons 
was heard all over the area for around an hour. 
During this time shots were heard and houses were 
burning in the Colegio area where around 200 refugees were 
sheltering after 1 7 houses had been burned down by BMP 
the previous week. According to eye-witness accounts, two 
local UNAMET staff Domingos Soares and Ruben Barros 
were shot in front of their homes by an army member and 
then hacked to death by BMP. 
On 3 September, all UNAMET military and police offi-
cers were evacuated from Mahana to Dili - the objective of 
the TNI/militia co-ordinated attack on Mahana had been 
achieved. Houses started burning at 7am and about 200 
houses were destroyed during the day. Around 20 refugees 
at Colegio were reportedly shot and/or hacked to death by 
Ritabou BMP members. 
After UNAMET left Mahana, around 30 armed militia 
members walked past the police command in full view of the 
chief-of-police and his men. Their conversation was over-
heard: 'Are they armed?' 'Yes. They must be from the Besi 
Merah Putih'. A refugee informed us that the militia were on 
their way up to the hills (Loilako) where hundreds of people 
had fled. Later a police helicopter was seen circling the hill 
area, the first heli seen that catastrophic day. 
As we evacuated Atambu, all of Mahana was burning 
with most of the houses along the road already destroyed. 
continuation from page 31 
There were several regional gatherings of the hand-
picked men, to which foreign diplomats and journalists 
were invited, culminating in the final Act, at which the 
1,025 'representatives' voted unanimously to stay with 
Indonesia. What the observers were not allowed to see was 
how the council members were told in no uncertain terms 
what would become of them should they vote the wrong 
way. 
After this farce, Indonesian officers were carried shoul-
der-high by Papuans as a piece of theatre, in a display of 
the 'brotherly love' between the military and the Papuans. 
The thirty-year betrayal 
In November the Sanz report was submitted to the UN 
General Assembly. Although so much had been happening 
in the months prior to the farce, the report devoted only a 
few paragraphs to the serious political violations that oc-
curred. Even so, that should have been enough to warn 
discerning members of the General Assembly that some-
thing was amiss. Although it concluded that the Act had 
resulted in a unanimous decision to remain with Indonesia, 
the General Assembly went no further than to 'take note' 
The deserted town with a population of 20,000 was now 
controlled by a handful of militia directed by the deputy 
army commander and· an estimated six Kopassus men. And 
Bobonaro had been rid of all international observers .. The 
operations that followed took place without any in~e1:1at1onal 
scrutiny. All lines of communication were cut within hours 
of our departure. 
Recent UN reconnaissance missions describe Mahana as 
'a town of rubble'. We think that the 200 refugees at the 
police station were taken to 'refugee camps' in Atambua or 
Kupang. Manuel Magalhaes, a former Bobonaro ~overn­
ment official and CNRT leader, was last seen at pohce HQ 
and is reported to have been killed. We have heard that after 
the ballot result was announced on 4 September, 20 or 30 
people were executed at the police station. 
The rest of the population of Bobonaro will be surviving 
in the hills and forests . Many of them have survived there 
before and said they are prepared to wait for independence. 
Some will have headed for the Bobonaro F alintil cantonment 
area. 
Now detached from that desperate situation, I recall how 
so many friends and acquaintances answered the question of 
whether East Timor would be an economically viable na-
tion: 'All we want to do is sleep. We have been waiting for 
24 years to sleep at night. ' We hope that one day the people 
of East Timor and the threatened diaspora will be able to 
sleep in peace. 
Name withheld 
of the result in its resolution of 19 November. The resolu-
tion was adopted by 84 votes with none against, but 30 
countries decided to abstain. There were enough misgiv-
ings for a number of African countries to table an amend-
ment calling for a second act of Papuan self-determination 
but this was rejected and the issue was forgotten. 
The comparison between what happened then and the 
UN's treatment of East Timor thirty years later could 
hardly be more stark. The plight of the East Timorese be-
came a major international issue, benefiting from public 
opinion already made aware by years of campaigning. The 
world's press and electronic media gave extensive cover-
age to the unspeakable brutalities perpetrated in East Timor 
in September this year. It was the same army that savaged 
the West Papuans thirty years ago and have been doing so 
ever since. 
It is high time for the international community to rec-
ognise that the people of West Papua have suffered a grave 
injustice at the hands of the United Nations. After thirty-six 
years of suffering under Indonesian occupation, the right of 
the people of West Papua to self-determination should be 
restored by a decision to include West Papua on the list of 
Non Self-Governing Territories. * 
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Legislation setbacks since Suharto ousted 
In the seventeen months the Habibie Government was in power, a number of laws were introduced 
which represent a serious setback for human rights and democracy. While creating the impression 
that it was bringing Indonesia into line with international human rights principles by ratifying sev-
eral important human rights instruments, Habibie's transitional government was tightening up anti-
human rights legislation and reinforcing the state's role against the individual. 
Ironically, these items of legislation were the product of 
a government which prided itself on being a reformasi ad-
ministration. Its minister of justice, Professor Muladi, who 
was in charge of drafting these laws had been a leading 
member of the National Human Rights Commission until 
his ministerial appointment by Suharto in 1997. 
Anti-subversion law given new clothes 
The notorious Anti-Subversion Law, introduced under 
President Sukarno in 1963, has been condemned for many 
years by human rights lawyers and activists and there have 
been constant demands for it to be repealed. This finally 
happened in April this year, but instead of putting an end 
once and for all to regulations that made citizens liable to 
trial and heavy penalties for engaging in political activities 
deemed to be a threat to the state, the provisions of the 
anti-subversion law were incorporated into the Criminal 
Code. 
When the members of Parliament, the old rubber-stamp 
DPR set up under Suharto, repealed the anti-subversion 
law in April this year, they introduced six new clauses into 
the Criminal Code making it a crime to promote Marx-
ism/Leninism in any way, to set up organisations which 
'can be deemed' to adhere to Marxism/J.,eninism or to seek 
to replace the state ideology, Pancasila, with penalties of 
up to twenty years. The criminal procedural code now ap-
plies to these laws, meaning that a suspect can no longer be 
held for up to one year, and the death sentence has been 
removed but despite these minor improvements, anti-
subversion regulations have now been integrated into the 
Criminal Code. 
The law reeks of Cold War ideology. The preamble as-
serts that 'Communist/Marxist/Leninist teachings 'manifest 
themselves in activities that contravene the basic principles 
and pillars of the God-fearing Indonesian nation and pose a 
direct threat to the life of the Indonesian nation'. The old 
anti-subversion law could hardly have put it more suc-
cinctly! 
These new articles now exist alongside a range of arti-
cles known as 'hate-spreading' articles as well as clauses 
making it an offence to 'insult the head of state' or 'officers 
of the state'. Habibie's Justice Minister, Muladi, is under-
taking an overhaul of the Criminal Code's 600 articles but 
bearing in mind his recent legislative antics, there is no 
reason to expect that the new Code will defend the rights of 
the individual against the state. 
Law on states of emergency. 
In the closing weeks of the old DPR's life, the members 
were under strong pressure to adopt a Law on States of 
Emergency which was tabled by General Wiranto, Minister 
of Defence and Security/Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. The law was rushed through despite a wave 
of protest from civil society. The law was finally adopted 
on 23 September, the day before that discredited body 
ended its term of office. 
All attempts by leaders of the political parties who 
would be taking up their seats in the country's new, demo-
cratically-elected parliament, student organisations and 
non-governm~ntal organisations to persuade the govern-
ment to aban'clon the Jaw were ignored. 
Draconian powers for the military 
The States of Emergency Law enables the head of state 
to ·declare a state of emergency 'in the interest of safe-
guarding and protecting the state' whenever the security 
forces deem that conditions have become ' unmanageable' 
or when it is deemed that ' rebellions' or ' attempts at sepa-
ration from the unitary state'· are underway. Three states of 
emergency are envisaged, the qighest being the declaration 
of martial law. A 'state of emergency' can be declared for 
the whole country or for a specific region. 
Under a state of emergency, power will be vested in the 
highest military authority to exercise a range of draconian 
powers including preventing people from moving in or out 
of the region, arrest and detention, controlling postal com-
munications, telecommunication and electronic communi-
cation (directed at the print and electronic media), search-
ing and confiscating private property, enforced conscrip-
tion by the military and a ban on strikes. 
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Indonesia's leading English-language daily, The Ja-
karta Post (20 September) described the law as ' the death 
knell for reformasi '. It wrote that despite last-minute 
amendments to assuage public outrage, the law will give 
the military 'almost unlimited power . .. including the right 
to jail people without trial'. ' Because the criteria for im-
posing a state of emergency is unclear, the legislation will 
give the president and the military the leeway to interpret 
situations according to their own political agendas.' 
The Indonesian armed forces, the TNI, has never been 
so discredited internationally and in the eyes of the Indone-
sian people as it is today. This new law is clearly intended 
to reserve special powers to confront social movements 
anywhere in Indonesia whenever the military consider that 
the authority of the state is under threat. The TNI sees the 
greatest threat as coming from regions like Aceh and West 
Papua where military violence has already pushed the 
population beyond endurance. If the law is retained under 
the new Wahid/Megawati administration, it is certain to be 
used primarily to crush movements calling for a referen-
dum or independence from the Indonesian state. 
Although under the law a state of emergency must be 
declared by the head of state or head of region, it is clear 
that the military will exert pressure to get the decision it 
wants. When in September this year, the TNI asked Presi-
dent Habibie to declare martial law in East Timor under a 
1959 law, Habibie initially turned down the request at a 
cabinet meeting but the next day he was forced to comply 
with the TNI' s demand. 
Defeated, with blood on the streets 
Within hours of the law being passed in parliament, at 
least seven thousand students paralysed the streets of Ja-
karta calling for the law to be repealed and for an end to 
militarism. The security forces were out in force, including 
special riot troops known as the PPRM, a combination of 
police and army crack troops. Shots rang out and student 
demonstrators trying to approach the parliament building 
were beaten back to the Semanggi flyover, near Atma Jaya 
Catholic University, the scene of a similar bloody con-
frontation between the armed forces and defenceless stu-
dents on 13 November last year. 
As the firing continued, some demonstrators shouted: 
'You're only brave enough to shoot your own people. Why 
don' t you go and fight the Australians in East Timor!' 
Forced to beat a retreat as dozens were wounded and 
taken into custody, students sought sanctuary in nearby 
bui ldings but were chased by the troops. By 8pm on 23 
September, the Atma Jaya campus was surrounded by 
PPRM troops. Before dawn the next day, the electricity 
was cut off and troops entered the campus under cover of 
dark. By this time, four persons were known to have died, 
including a member of the security forces. 
The confrontation continued for most of the following 
day. By the early evening when things had calmed down, 
in a wilful act of state terror, a truck full of troops sped 
along a road where hundreds of students were congregating 
and opened fire on a crowd of people sitting in a coffee 
stall near Jakarta's main hospital. Three people were shot 
dead including Yun Hap, a student at the University of In-
donesia, and a nine-year old boy who happened to be 
seated nearby. The final death toll rose to eight when a 
woman student later died of her injuries. 
As is their habit, the army sought to shift the blame for 
the mass protests and deaths on 'outside forces' who were 
alleged to have incited the students. One unlikely scape-
goat was a well-known professor, Subroto, the former sec-
retary-general of the oil cartel, OPEC. Army claims that 
live ammunition had not been used were contradicted by 
medical staff who examined the dead and treated the 
wounded. 
Thousands more demonstrated in Bandung, West Java, 
Yogyakarta, Central Java and in Surabaya, East Java. In 
Lampung, South Sumatra, two people were killed as thou-
sands demonstrated against the law and against militarism. 
Presidential ratification put on hold 
The day after the law was passed in parliament, with 
public opinion angered by the violence on the streets 
Habibie came under pressure to call off the troops and re: 
voke the law. Late on Friday, after the sixth young life had 
been lost, the TNI spokesperson, Major-General Sudradjat 
announced that President Habibie would delay signing the 
bill into law. 
It is not yet clear what will happen to this law when the 
new DPR assembles. Will it be left to the new head of state 
to sign the bill as it stands into law, or will the DPR seek to 
amend or to scrap the law? The only correct way forward, 
to safeguard Indonesia's fragile democracy, is for this law 
to be scrapped and for the 1959 law on states of emergency 
which it replaces to be scrapped as well. 
Human Rights Court set up 
The ~hird ~aw which creates an illusion of promoting 
human nghts 1s the Perpu (presidential decree in lieu of a 
law) setting up a Human Rights Couit. It was enacted in 
Sept~mber. in ~reat haste in a deliberate move to pre-empt 
UN mv~s~1gat1ons and possible indictments following the 
UN decision to set up an international commission of in-
quiry into abuse~ in ~ast Timor (see separate article). 
The court 1s bemg set up to try a number of serious 
human_ri~hts a~use; it charges the National Human Rights 
~om~1ss1.on with the task of conducting the preliminary 
m~est1gat1ons which could lead to formal charges being 
laid by the Attorney General. Although it sounds like a 
move in the direction of bringing violators to justice, the 
continued on page 11 
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West Papua's fake referendum 
Thirty years ago a referendum was conducted in the Indonesian archipelago under very different 
circumstances than the one eonducted by UNAMET in East Timor. In July and August 1969 a so-
called 'act of free choice' took place in West Papua with the UN vainly attempting to play a supervi-
sory role. It was nothing more than an tragedy stage-managed by the Indonesian military. It led to 
the ultimate betrayal of the West Papuan people by the international community. 
·The 'Act of Free Choice' is known to the Papuans cyni-
cally as the 'Act of No Choice'. A council of 1,025 West 
Papuan 'tribal leaders', hand picked by the Indonesian 
military, w.ere forced to show their allegiance and loyalty 
to Jakarta by voting unanimously to remain part of the In-
donesian Republic. The military did not want a majority 
vote, they demanded unanimity. The claim that these coun-
cil members represented the 800,000 inhabitants was a fic-
tion. 
The Act was held in fulfilment of a 1962 agreement 
brokered by the US to end the smouldering conflict be-
tween Indonesia and the Dutch and force the colonial 
power to accede to the wishes of Jakarta. On 19 November 
1969 the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 2504 (XXIV), 'taking note' of the report of UN 
Special Rapporteur Ortiz Sanz about the conduct of the 
'Act of Free Choice'. West Papua was then removed from 
the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories of the UN De-
colonisation Commission (Commission 24) and became 
Indonesia's 26th province. 
The transitional years of Indonesian rule 
Following the 1962 agreement, known as the New York 
agreement, the territory was briefly handed over to a tran-
sitional UN administration but even under UNTEA, the 
Papuans felt the heavy hand of the Indonesian police and 
military. All symbols of West Papuan culture were de-
stroyed and political activities in support of a true act of 
self-determination were brutally crushed. Even though the 
UN was supposed to be in control, there were arrests, tor-
ture and acts of intimidation started under the very noses of 
UNTEA officials. 
time: "The Indonesians have tried everything from bomb-
ing them with B26s, to shelling and mortaring them, but a 
continuous state of semi-rebellion persists". 
The feeble efforts of Ortiz Sanz 
The Bolivian diplomat Ortiz Sanz was chosen to head 
the UN mission and from the outset, all the odds were 
stacked against him. The Indonesians rejected a UN pro-
posal for a one-person-one-vote referendum, alleging that 
the Papuans were 'too primitive' to take part in such an 
exercise. They insisted instead on a 'consultative process'. 
Already the Indonesians had begun to select 'peoples rep-
resentatives'. Instead of arm-twisting Jakarta or pulling out 
altogether, Ortiz Sanz and his team stayed on and play 
along with the Indonesian ploy. It was already clear by 
then that any Papuan dissent vote against Indonesia would 
be treated as an act of treason. 
The UN team received numerous petitions from Papu-
ans pleading for a proper referendum but the UN team was 
contemptuous of West Papuan attitudes. In a confidential 
report to New York, Ortiz Sanz wrote: "As you are very 
well aware only an insignificant percentage of the popula-
tion is capable or has interest in any political actions or 
even thoughts". 
Ortiz Sanz' racist attitude reflected the general opinion 
of the international community and the UN leadership that 
time. All that U Thant, the UN Secretary-General, wanted 
was to get rid of the issue and hand over the territory to 
Jakarta as quick as possible. 
As the vote neared, Papuan resistance was growing 
stronger with the level of oppression growing apace. In 
May 1969 Ortiz Sanz made a final effort to postpone the 
vote until political freedoms and the human rights situation 
improved. In the meantime popular revolt against the Indo-
nesians grew by the day and thousands of Papuans showed 
their public defiance against Jakarta rule. 
In May 1963, the administration was handed over to In-
donesia and West Papua came directly under the Indone-
sian jackboot. There was plenty of evidence of Indonesian 
atrocities including military attacks on villages, rapes and 
the torching of villages but all this was hidden from view. 
The 'international community' notably the Netherlands, the Ali Murtopo, the fixer 
US, Australia and the UN were ready to accept a fait ac- The man in charge of the 'Act of Free Choice' was 
compli that would force West Papua to become a part of Major-General Ali Murtopo, who was then Indonesia's 
Indonesia. second most powerful man after Suharto. Ali Murtopo will 
The UN returned to the territory in 1968 to undertake a go down in Indonesian history as one of the most sinister 
supervisory role during the 'Act of Free Choice' the fol- military intelligence officers and one of the main architect 
lowing year. By now, resistance by the West Papuans was of Suharto's Orde Baru. He it was who designed the mili-
widespread and the Free Papua Movement (OPM) had tary-students alliance that brought Sukarno's government 
been formed. State brutality intensified and West Papuans to its knees; who transformed Golkar into an electoral ve-
saw how their new masters shamelessly looted every re- hicle for Suharto and who was the fixer for the ·' Act of Free 
movable thing in sight. As one US diplomat noted at the Choice'. continued on page 28 
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Splitting the people into three 
There has been a storm of protest throughout West Papua against a government decision to split the 
province of lrian Jaya into three provinces. The decision is seen as a divisive move at a time when 
the West Papuan people have united around the demand/or independence. 
For three decades, the issue of independence for West 
Papua was an unmentionable topic. The only ones to raise 
the demand were the guerrillas fighting in the bush under 
the banner of the Free Papua Movement, the OPM. While 
being careful to keep a distance from the independence 
issue, human rights activists and tribal people challenging 
the operations of the giant copper and gold mining com-
pany Freeport/Rio Tinto in Timika, were nevertheless fre-
quently branded as 'separatists' or members of the OPM, 
with all the risks that this involved. 
Following the downfall of the dictator Suharto, inde-
pendence calls began to reverberate as never before and 
people started to refer to themselves publicly as Papuans, a 
term that had been strictly forbidden since Indonesia took 
over the territory. In July last year, the Papuan Morning 
Star flag was raised in a number of cities. The security 
forces responded to these peaceful actions violently. The 
flag-raising incident in Biak ,which had gone on peacefully 
for five days was attacked by crack forces of the army us-
ing live ammunition and a number of people were killed. 
The struggle then took on a new form with the creation 
of FORERI, supported by the Protestant and Catholic 
churches, which became a platform for the issue of West 
Papua's status to become a matter of public debate. This 
culminated in a meeting in February this year between 
West Papuan leaders calling themselves the 'Team of One 
Hundred' and President Habibie at which the issue of inde-
pendence was raised. While the President was non-
committal, he advised the Team to go home and 'consider 
the issue carefully'. 
Taking their cue from the President's advice, the mem-
bers of the Team decided to socialise the issue by setting 
up posts in many localities throughout the territory. But 
this was not acceptable to the security forces; the chief of 
police declared that such activities were unlawful and or-
dered all the posts to be closed. However, this did nothing 
to dampen people's eagerness to press for independence. 
Splitting tactics 
armed forces in the closing years of the Suharto regime 
claimed that this was being done for greater efficiency in 
the running of such a large territory. But this explanation 
has not impressed the West Papuans. 
As several West Papuan figures have pointed out, the 
initiative for the decision has come from the armed forces. 
According to the student leader Demianus T. Wanembo, 
the aim is to dampen the aspirations of the people for inde-
pendence by forcing them to focus their attention on differ-
ent issues. Conflicts and feelings of envy can easily 
emerge, he said, because of differing levels of prosperity in 
the three provinces. This could create horizontal conflicts, 
undermining the unity of the people. He warned that there 
could be an increase in the number of regional military 
commands and a rise in the number of army personnel on 
the ground. 'The people's aspirations will be crushed, they 
will be intimidated. The decision has nothing to do with 
developing lrian, it is nothing less than a project of 
HANKAM (the defence and security establishment).' 
[Media Komunikasi, August 1999] 
Protests erupt everywhere 
The decision to appoint governors of the three new 
provinces led to protests in many parts of West Papua. 
Following a peaceful protest in Jayapura on 14 October, 
thousands of protesters occupied the governor's office the 
next day. Words of support even came from senior offi-
cials, including the deputy governor R.G. Djopari when he 
met a delegation of protesters; he seemed to be shocked by 
the decision. 
There were protests in many other places including 
Biak and Nabire, where more than 1,000 people joined in. 
and marched to the local assembly. The protest in Biak was 
supported by more than 350 people who marched to the 
office of the district head. 
One of the biggest demonstrations took place in 
Merauke in the south-east comer of West Papua. Thou-
sands of people clogged the streets in the vicinity of the 
local assembly building on 22 Octo~er calling for inde-
The response from Jakarta was to go ahead with a pro- pendence and condemning the government's decision. 
posal for the province of Irian Jaya to be split into three Residents in Merauke were particularly angry following 
provinces. the sinking of a ferry off the south coast a few days earlier, 
A government decree was adopted in September fol- with a heavy loss of life. The ferry disaster had already 
lowing discussions in a new body that had been created by sparked angry scenes in Merauke with people demanding 
the Habibie administration, called the Council for the Con- that families whose relatives were unaccounted for should 
solidation of Security and the System of Law, with a pre- be assisted in coping with their loss and guaranteed com-
ponderance of representatives from the armed forces. The pensation. There is a deep sense of grievance because the 
move was announced by General Feisal Tanjung, who was shipping company which owns the ferry has been accused 
then Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Af- of using vessels u.n~t for se~ice. The protests quickly be-
fairs. Tanjung who had been commander-in-chief of the came charged poht1cally, with calls on the central govem-
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ment to respect the people aspirations for independence 
and withdraw its decision to split up the province. 
Protesters have questioned Jakarta's motives, saying: 
'For years the central government has never listened to our 
aspirations. Why are they suddenly dividing up our prov-
ince and installing new governors?' 
More than a hundred West Papuan students Jakarta held 
a street protest in front of a five-star hotel where members 
of the MPR, the People's Legislative Assembly, were 
staying. Some of the demonstrators were carrying the OPM 
flag, something that would have been unimaginable during 
the Suharto era. 
The three governors who have been installed are Abra-
ham Oktavianus Atuturi as governor of West Irian Jaya, 
Herman Monim as governor of Central Irian Jaya and 
somebody new as governor of East Irian Jaya. Fred Num-
beri the previous governor for the whole province of Irian 
Jaya has become minister in the new cabinet. 
Special autonomy status 
While all this was happening, the supreme legislative 
body, the MPR, meeting in Jakarta, adopted a decision re-
quiring the new government to confer special autonomy 
status on Irian Jaya. It was also instructed to conduct in-
vestigations into past human rights abuses there and prose-
cute those responsible. The intention is clearly to dampen 
the fervour in favour of breaking away from Indonesia. 
The MPR does not appear to have addressed the decision 
to split Irian Jaya into three provinces. 
It is unlikely that special status will be acceptable as the 
fraudulent 'act of free choice' still needs to be addressed. 
WEST PAPUA 
Now that the injustices of that act have been widely and 
publicly discussed, with calls for a genuine act of self-
determination, the new government under President Abdur-
rahman Wahid may face one of its first challenges in a 
province that contributes so heavily to the national purse. 
After taking office, President Wahid announced that 
Vice-President Megawati would be charged with tackling a 
number of 'thorny problems' in the eastern regions, in-
cluding Irian Jaya. 
New documents received 
Two lengthy documents analysing recent events in 
West Papua have been received. One is by ELS-HAM, the 
Institute for the Study and Advocacy of Human Rights on 
the events in Mapnduma in mid 1996, in the immediate 
aftermath of the hostage crisis. Published in August 1999, 
it is entitled: 'The Military Operation to Free the Hostages 
and the Violation of Human Rights in the Central High-
lands of Irian Jaya: Exposing the Bloody Mission of the 
International Red Cross, and the Involvement of Foreign 
Soldiers and the Indonesian National Army. ' 
The other document is a report by the Justice and Peace 
Commission of the Diocese of Jayapura which was pub-
lished in July 1999 under the title: 'The Impact of the Pres-
ence of the Security Forces on Local Communities and on 
Human Rights in the Bintang Mountains, 1998 to the Be-
ginning of 1999. ' 
A summary will be in our next issue. • 
UI<-INDONESIA TIES 
Britain must share the blame 
'For two years no other country with an embassy in Jakarta has done more for East Timor' wrote 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook in the Observer on 19 September. Objective observers would argue to 
the contrary that Britain, along with other major powers, must share responsibility for the appalling 
violence and humanitarian crisis suffered by the East Timorese people. 
On May 5, Britain, as a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council, affirmed the fatally-flawed accords, 
which placed security in the hands of the Indonesian 
authorities responsible for massive violations of human 
rights and killings during 23 years of armed occupation. 
By proceeding with the ballot on August 30 under 
wholly inadequate security conditions, the international 
community set the East Timorese people up for the 
slaughter and political cleansing which has taken place. 
According to Robin Cook, Britain took the lead on East 
Timor in Europe and in the Security Council so he must 
accept a large share of the blame. 
Even on the day of the ballot, which was relatively 
peaceful, people were fleeing to the mountains afraid that 
they would be killed if the vote went in favour of inde-
pendence. They were desperate for 'internationals' to stay 
after the ballot, but were sadly deserted because the Secu-
rity Council was not prepared to provide Unamet with the 
necessary security mandate to protect its own personnel, let 
alone the East Timorese people. 
Prevarication and appeasement 
What has happened was widely predicted and, there-
fore, preventable. It was clear for many weeks before the 
ballot that the Indonesian police and army were unwilling 
to maintain security. No attempt was made to disarm the 
militias, whose leaders openly threatened a 'bloodbath' in 
the event of an independence vote. 
Human rights organisations and observer groups con-
sistently warned of the likelihood of violence. In June, 
TAPOL wrote to the then Foreign Office minister Geoffrey 
Hoon and asked him to promote in the Security Council the 
idea of an armed UN presence to safeguard security during 
the consultation. His insulting reply accused T APOL of 
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proposing 'wrecking amendments . .. which would unravel 
the whole Agreement' . 
On 24 August, the IFET Observer Project wrote to Kofi 
Annan from Dili and said: 'There are pervasive fears that 
the Indonesian-military backed militias will launch a wave 
of terror around or shortly after the time of the ballot in an 
effort to derail the consultation process . .. fears of a blood-
bath are based on a variety of credible factors .' 
Kofi Annan was supposed to make a formal determi-
nation that the security conditions were conducive to a free 
and fair ballot, but he never did. UN officials discussed 
contingency plans for the post-ballot period for weeks, but 
no formal strategy was finalised. If the pressure eventually 
exerted by the international community on Jakarta to allow 
an international force (lnterfet) into East Timor had been 
applied much earlier, many lives may have been saved and 
the humanitarian catastrophe averted. 
Robin Cook would have us believe that Jakarta' s ac-
ceptance of Interfet was a triumph for British diplomacy. 
In truth, the British Government's efforts have been a 
mishmash of prevarication and appeasement. In accepting 
Indonesian assurances concerning security, it was guilty of 
complacency and negligence of the worst kind. 
Arms embargo resisted 
Robin Cook knows better than anyone that Indonesian 
assurances are worthless. In July, a British Aerospace 
Hawk aircraft made two low passes over Dili in a clear act 
of intimidation the day before the start of registration. 
Both the British and Indonesian governments later admitted 
the flight had taken place. 
The British Government has always treated previous 
eye-witness reports of Hawks with contempt, preferring to 
rely on Indonesian assurances that they would not be used 
in East Tim or. The Government's disgraceful response to 
this further crisis of credibility for its ethical foreign policy 
was to seek yet more meaningless assurances from Indone-
sia. The British Government should have stopped further 
Hawk deliveries there and then, but preferred to wait until 
East Timor was in ruins before sanctioning its friends in 
the Indonesian military. 
Since Robin Cook is fully aware that the Indonesian 
military has always been the problem in East Timor, it 
beggars belief that he remains resolute in his defence of 
arms sales. The Government's reliance on the tired old 
arguments that Indonesia requires arms for self-defence 
and that export licences granted by the Tories cannot be 
revoked is now frankly embarrassing and plainly wrong. 
As T APOL has repeated many times, the power to revoke 
licences is set out in the arms control legislation and legal 
opinion has confirmed that the Government has the right to 
exercise that power. 
Equally embarrassing was Robin Cook's failure to 
withdraw an invitation to Indonesian military personnel to 
attend an arms fair in Surrey on 14 September. Eventually 
they decided not to take up the invitation. 
The claim by Robin Cook in his Observer article that 
arms sales to Indonesia under Labour 'have all but van-
ished' is not true. According to ministerial statements in 
Hansard, over 120 licences for Indonesia have been 
granted in the two-and-a-half years since Labour came to 
power. Mr Cook's argument that nearly all t~es~ licences 
are for spares and services for Tory contracts is melevant; 
spare parts are as lethal as the equipment they service. 
Concern over ECGD support 
There is now understandable public and parliamentary 
concern that sales of military equipment to Indonesia are 
heavily underwritten by the Export Credit Guarantee De-
partment (ECGD). The ECGD is currently paying claims 
in relation to the deferment of principal agreed when Indo-
nesia rescheduled part of its public sector debt in Septem-
ber 1998 [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 149/150]. Included in 
that rescheduled debt was £ 130 million for the purchase of 
Hawk aircraft [Financial Times, 16 September 1999]. By 
the end of July 1999, £48 million had been paid out by 
ECGD in relation to military contracts [letter ECGD to 
Campaign Against Arms Trade, 28 July 1999]. 
Although the ECGD is funded by the exporting compa-
nies and aims to break even, in the last resort any shortfall 
has to be met by the British taxpayer. Even if Indonesia 
does eventually repay the principal and there is no cost to 
the taxpayer, there is widespread concern that a govern-
ment department underwrites arms sales without any regard 
to ethical and human rights criteria. 
Licences suspended, deliveries continue 
The Government's dogged resistance to stopping arms 
sales eventually broke down only after a week of appalling 
mayhem and terror in East Timor following the announce-
ment of the ballot result on 4 September and after the im-
position of military sanctions by the US and Australia. 
A four-month suspension of existing licences and em-
bargo on new sales came into effect on 16 September. 
Within a week, however, three more Hawk aircraft were 
being delivered in apparent contravention of the order sus-
pending the licences. The aircraft, flown by British pilots, 
were on their way to Indonesia at the time the order was 
made. It appears they were intercepted en route and or-
dered to land in Bangkok. The British Government was 
concerned about whether the pilots should go ahead with 
the delivery, but eventually instructed them to continue 
their journey. Ann Clwyd MP has tabled questions in par-
liament to ascertain why the delivery was permitted. 
The four-month suspension and embargo is inadequate 
and must continue until, at the very least, the new Indone-
sian Government has facilitated the safe return of all those 
forced out of East Timor, disarmed and disbanded the mi-
litias it created and controlled, and ensured all those re-
sponsible for human rights violations have been brought to 
justice. 
Nor should arms sales continue as long as the Indone-
sian army continues to exert control on the population by 
means of its repressive territorial command structure. • 
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Killings and disappearances escalate in Aceh 
Press reports portray conditions in Aceh as being grim. Killings and disappearances are daily events 
as villagers flee their homes in the face of army or police intrusions. President Wahid has appointed 
an Acehnese as minister for human rights at a time when the central government's standing in Aceh 
is weakening by the day and demands for a referendum is gaining ever wider support. 
The present situation in Aceh is characterised by a deep-
ening sense of alienation from Jakarta, dissatisfaction with the 
ham-handed operations by the Indonesian army and police, 
casualties every day on both sides, growing grassroots support 
for Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and renewed calls for a referen-
dum. 
While Acehnese activists were disappointed by the failure 
of the MPR at its recent session to adopt a special decree 
about Aceh, the new head of state surprised everyone by cre-
ating a ministry for human rights and appointing an Acehnese 
to the post. The MPR adopted a decision to grant special 
autonomy status to Aceh but since Aceh got nothing out of the 
'special status' that it was granted in the 1950s, this is not 
going to impress most Acehnese. 
The appointment of Hasballah M. Saad as minister for 
human rights has prompted hopes that the new government is 
serious about resolving grappling with the many human rights 
abuses, especially in Aceh. A former student activist and 
founder of a coalition of Acehnese NGOs, Hasballah has po-
sitioned himself within the Indonesian political scene and is 
not sympathetic to demands for a referendum in Aceh. Some 
commentators wonder why this new post was necessary. 
'Why not make effective use of the National Human Rights 
Commission, which until now has been toothless,' some peo-
ple have asked. Acehnese say that Hasballah' s top priority 
must be to bring the perpetrators in Aceh during the DOM 
period to justice. 
GAM-TNI clashes intensify 
The many reports in the Indonesian press of soldiers and 
police being killed or disappearing suggest that armed conflict 
between guerrillas fighting under the banner of Free Aceh 
(GAM) and the Indonesian army and special police troops are 
happening almost daily. There is also a steady stream of news 
about members of the general public disappearing or being 
found dead. In most cases, the perpetrators have not been 
identified. 
The impact on local residents is traumatic. When soldiers 
or police are killed or are said to have disappeared, troops 
respond by conducting sweepings in the countryside, terrify-
ing villagers and causing them to flee to the safety of the 
nearest town. Although the number of refugees has now de-
clined as many have returned to their villages, there are still a 
number of refugee centres. 
Thousands of refugees taking refuge in Abu Beureueh 
Mosque, Pidie were panic-stricken when troops surrounded 
their sanctuary and started firing into the air. The chief of po-
lice said his men were looking for six people suspected of 
killing two police officers and that the refugees were not the 
target but some were wounded in scuffles with the security 
forces and had to be rushed to hospital. 
At the beginning of September, two thousand people from 
several districts in Pidie travelled in a convoy of buses and 
trucks to Banda Aceh to attend a rally by students. On the 
way, they were stopped by security forces in Glumpangtiga 
district and told not to continue 'for their own safety' . The 
infuriated people then lay down on the road in protest. 
[Jakarta Post, 3 September] 
In another incident, two army trucks collided with a lorry 
full of timber coming in the opposite direction. The soldiers 
got down and started firing. A young boy was injured in the 
leg and the lorry driver and two others on the lorry were ar-
rested and beaten up. 
Many civilians are falling victim in this war of attrition; 
animosity towards the security forces is running high and 
sympathy for GAM is growing. A woman whose husband has 
been abducted told a journalist:. 'We are ready to join GAM if 
those responsible for our husbands' disappearance are not 
brought to justice.' [Jakarta Post, 14 September] 
Muslim preachers want a referendum 
Calls for a referendum have continued to reverberate. In 
September they came from an unexpected quarter when Mus-
lim preachers from all over Aceh held a congress and issued a 
call for a referendum. Until then, they had distanced them-
selves from such a stand. The NU leader, Abdurrahman Wa-
hid, had been invited and wept as the decision was read out. 
He said he could not do otherwise than agree ' although it 
makes me very sad indeed'. [Media Indonesia, 16 September] 
Now that he is Indonesia's president, Gus Dur, a he is known, 
will face strong demands to honour his declaration of support 
for a referendum. 
Students who were the first to call for a referendum in 
January forced Jakarta to postpone the creation of a military 
command for Aceh. They ended a sit-in at the local assembly 
after securing a promise by President Habibie to postpone the 
decision until a new local assembly is elected and expresses 
its views on the matter. 
Local government breaking down 
In September, two thirds of the village chiefs in Pidie, six 
hundred in all, handed back their seals of office to their supe-
riors and said that they could no longer work effectively. 'The 
security situation has made it impossible for us to do our 
work. We can't even protect ourselves, let alone the lives of 
our villagers,' one village head said. [Waspada, I October] At 
the same time, thousands of government employees in North 
Aceh failed to tum up for work, bringing the administration to 
a virtual halt, an action that lasted several days. They were 
apparently acting at the behest of GAM. * 
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UN Commission of Inquiry set up 
A UN decision to set up an international commission of inquiry into Indonesian atrocities in East 
Timor should end the cycle of impunity that has protected Indonesian military personnel from being 
brought to justice for their crimes against humanity. However, a UN Security Council resolution has 
damaged the prospects of the chances of an international criminal tribunal being set up. 
The inquiry commission was approved by the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights at an emergency session in Geneva 
in September. 
The Commission met after UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Mary Robinson denounced Indonesian atroci-
ties after interviewing East Timorese refugees and UN staff in 
Darwin. She said: 'There is overwhelming evidence that East 
Timor has seen a deliberate, vicious and systematic campaign 
of gross violations of human rights. ' 
Jakarta defeated after bitter dispute 
The Commission heard evidence from Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate, Bishop Belo, Aniceto Guterres, director of Yayasan 
HAK, East Timor's leading human rights organisation, East 
Timorese witnesses and foreign observers. 
The resolution which was tabled by the European Union 
and sponsored by more than forty countries faced fierce oppo-
sition from Indonesia, backed by Asian states. Indonesia 
wants investigations to be left to fact-finding commission in 
Indonesia set up by Indonesia's National Human Rights 
Commission (Komnas HAM). 
Jakarta was desperate to quash the resolution fearing that 
thoroughgoing international investigations could result in an 
international tribunal being set up to indict Indonesian mili-
tary personnel. The aim is to protect the murderous Indone-
sian armed forces, the TNI, from being brought to justice be-
fore an international court. 
The resolution which was adopted by 32 votes to twelve 
with six abstentions calls for the establishment of an interna-
tional commission of inquiry and for all the main UN thematic 
special rapporteurs - for extra-judicial killings, torture, vio-
lence against women, internally displaced persons - and the 
Working Group on disappearances to conduct missions in 
East Timor and report to the Commission and the General 
Assembly next year. 
However, while asserting that the international community 
'will exert every effort' to ensure that those responsible are 
brought to justice, the resolution affirms that the 'primary 
responsibility for bringing perpetrators to justice rests with 
national judicial systems'. 
Jakarta snubs the UN 
Having failed to prevent the UN Human Rights Commis-
sion from putting Indonesia on the spot, the Indonesian gov-
ernment announced that it rejected the resolution and would 
only recognise the findings of its own fact-finding commis-
sion. 
It is preposterous for anyone to believe that Komnas 
HAM's fact-finding commission will be allowed by the mili-
tary to conduct thoroughgoing investigations or that East 
Timorese will want to testify to a body whose intentions they 
have every reason to distrust. While the UN commission will 
investigate abuses since the beginning of 1999, Jakarta's fact-
finding commission will only investigate abuses after the 
ballot on 30 August. 
Obstacles emerge 
The resolution should have been endorsed by the UN Se-
curity Council which has the powers to set up an international 
crimes tribunal. However 'Asian solidarity' came to Indone-
sia's aid once again when China, using its threat of a veto, 
refused to accept any reference to the commission of inquiry 
in a Security Council resolution adopted on 25 October. This 
in effect means leaving it to Indonesia to indict (or not indict) 
the criminals. 
Another setback is that there has been an unconscionable 
delay in the commission's first visit to East Timor which will 
not now take place until mid November, much to the disap-
pointment of rights activists in East Timor who want the in-
quiry to start immediately and fear that any delay opens the 
prospects of evidence being destroyed. * 
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